Before the COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Washington, D.C.

In the matter of:

The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings | Docket No. and Ephemeral Recordings 2005-1 CRB DTRA (Webcasting Rate Adjustment Proceeding)

Volume 10

Room LM-414 Library of Congress First and Independence Ave,, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20540

Tuesday, May 16, 2006

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m.

#### **BEFORE:**

THE HONORABLE JAMES SLEDGE, Chief Judge THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. ROBERTS, JR., Judge THE HONORABLE STAN WISNIEWSKI, Judge

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

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1	P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2	9:35 a.m.
3	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Good morning.
4	We'll come to order.
5	Mr. Steinthal?
6	MR. STEINTHAL: Thank you, Your
7	Honor.
8	CROSS-EXAMINATION (CONT'D)
9	BY MR. STEINTHAL:
10	Q Good morning, Dr. Pelcovits. How
11	are you?
12	A Good morning, Mr. Steinthal.
13	Q We picked up just for a moment
14	where we left off yesterday on the issue of
15	non-subscription statutory licensed webcasters
16	versus subscription webcasters for a minute.
17	I'd like you to assume, for
18	purposes of my question, that 75 to 90 percent
19	of the universe of unique listeners to
20	statutory licensed webcasting are non-
21	subscription webcasters listen to non-
22	subscription webcasters. Okay?

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1	And assume as well that a
2	substantial majority of that universe is not
3	and never will be willing to pay for radio.
4	Okay?
5	A Yes.
6	Q Now, you currently make no
7	allowance in your model for the demand
8	represented by those consumers. Correct?
9	A Not explicitly, no.
10	Q And I think you testified
11	yesterday that for purposes of your model, you
12	assumed that all the demand was represented by
13	the higher value users, who are subscription
14	users of statutory licensed webcasting.
15	Correct?
16	A I wouldn't say I assumed it but I
17	calibrated the model and the estimate of value
18	from the subscription customers, yes.
19	Q And not taking into consideration
20	that non-subscription universe. Correct?
21	A I just repeat the answer I just
22	gave you, which is, I calibrated it that way

and I think I explained the reasons why I 1 believe it should apply across the board. 2 Well, you stated yesterday that 3 0 one reason that you did not consider non-4 subscription users was concerns over the non-5 subscription or low value users cannibalizing 6 the subscription service market. Correct? 7 Well. the other than 8 А I did consider them but the reason 9 consider. I did not try to -- one of the reasons I did 10 11 not try to separately value those customers was because of concerns over cannibalization, 12 that's correct. 13 14 Did you do any study or analysis 15 of the extent to which non-subscription webcast users currently do or would, 16 1.7 future, cannibalize subscription statutory 18 licensed webcasting? 19 No, I did not. Let me just add, 20

in order to really to that you'd need sort of an experiment of changing prices for the statutory license and see how the market

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1	reacts.	So,	I	didn'	t

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Q Now also yesterday, on your direct testimony in the morning, I believe you testified that, in connection with why you weren't going to make an allowance for non-subscription statutory licensed webcast listeners, you made an analogy to the motion picture market, did you not?

A Well again, I don't use the word didn't make an allowance for, but I did make an analogy to the motion picture industry where for purposes of explaining that, there could be a value to using a form of media in an advertiser supported forum that could potentially cannibalize the revenues from a subscription.

Q Well it's true, is it not, that movie copyright owners license their content both in theatrical release markets and the advertiser supported free television market. Correct?

A They do but not at the same time

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and it depends on the show. So, yes, they do and they do under their own estimate of how to make profits in their business.

Q Wouldn't you agree that any complete economic analysis of the motion picture business would have to take into consideration the various revenue streams of motion pictures, including theatrical release, home video, pay per view, and advertiser supported free TV?

A My answer is it depends on what it is that you're analyzing. I would say and, if we're going to draw this analogy, that if the Court here were setting rates for motion picture copyrights and they were to compel the motion picture industry to base its rates for per view off of the advertising paid when a motion picture finally reaches the broadcast TV, they would be under-valuing the value of that copyright.

Q But the reality is that in the motion picture industry it's true, is it not,

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1	that motion picture copyright owners derive
2	different levels of compensation on a per use
3	or per view basis comparing theatrical release
4	to home video release to advertiser supported
5	television, don't they?
6	A Yes.
7	Q And they get a heck of a lot more
8	in a theatrical release market per view than
9	they do in the advertiser supported free TV
10	market, don't they?
11	A They do and add in a very
12	important part of their revenue stream, which
13	is DVDs.
14	Q And that comes in in the middle.
15	Right? I mean, you pay roughly \$4 per view
16	for a DVD compared to \$10 per view for a
17	theatrical motion picture. Right?
18	A What's interesting is that they're
19	getting that 50 percent of the ticket price in
20	a movie theater and 50 percent of the price in
21	a DVD rental.
22	Q And the advertiser supported

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1	thing, the advertiser supported per view
2	analysis would be a fraction, wouldn't it?
3	A I don't know. I've never seen it
4	expressed as a percentage.
5	Q Now I believe you testified on
6	your direct yesterday, and it's on page 32 of
7	your written testimony as well, you assume for
8	your model, do you not, that the ratio of the
9	consumer price for a subscription music
10	service to the sound recording royalty rate
11	would be the same in both your benchmark
12	market and your target market. Correct?
13	A Yes.
14	Q And that's a key assumption in
15	your analysis?
16	A It is.
17	Q And you base this assumption on
18	your opinion, and this is also on page 32, I
19	believe, that the demand elasticity in both
20	the target market and the benchmark market
21	will be very similar, if not the same.
22	Correct?

1	A Yes.
2	Q And that's based on your
3	comparison, your analysis of the comparison
4	between the benchmark market and the target
5	market. Correct?
6	A It's based on the fact that that
7	these are very similar markets, similar types
8	of consumers and also based on general
9	knowledge of elasticity estimates and pricing
10	practices in a variety of industries.
11	Q But I believe you also testified,
12	based on your conclusion that the supply and
13	demand characteristics in both markets are
14	comparable. Correct?
15	A I didn't say comparable. I think
16	I already just said what I said, which is they
17	have similar buyers and similar sellers.
18	They're very similar markets.
19	Q But there were no differences you
20	identified in that respect that would change
21	your opinion with respect to the elasticity
22	issue. Right?

1	A I felt that it was a reasonable
2	assumption that the elasticities were similar
3	and that they were close enough to apply the
4	same percentage in the two markets. I cannot
5	say they are exactly the same. It could be
6	somewhat higher, it could be somewhat lower.
7	It would yield, in my opinion, a result that
8	would be at or close to the one that I
9	recommend.
10	Q Now your model, looking at page 34
11	of your statement, also assumes, does it not,
12	that any change in the copyright fees can be
13	passed on dollar for dollar to consumers in
14	both the benchmark and the target markets.
15	Correct?
16	A In this model, that's correct.
17	Q And when you're talking about
18	copyright fees, you're talking about the sound
19	recording copyright fees. Correct?
20	A Correct.
21	Q And that's the normal assumption
22	in a competitive market with constant average

1	and marginal costs, is it not?
2	A Yes.
3	Q But as you testified yesterday,
4	you took this market as it is, without any
5	analysis of whether it's a competitive market.
6	Correct?
7	A I used a competitive market model
8	for purposes of estimating and recommending a
9	rate, that's correct.
10	Q Now, did you do any analysis,
11	going back to the question of whether your
12	assumption that in the target market or the
13	benchmark market, the copyright fees could be
14	passed through to consumers dollar by dollar,
15	did you do any analysis of either the target
16	market or the benchmark market to determine in
17	fact whether statutory licensed webcasting
18	services, for example, would be able to pass
19	off, dollar for dollar, increases in sound
20	recording royalty costs?
21	A I studied the industry. I looked
22	at the rapid evolution and entry of many firms

into the industry and it's my belief that in 1 an industry where you see entry taking place 2 relatively easily, the competitive model is a 3 reasonable model used. 4 This Let me pause right there. 5 0 6 notion of rapid entry into the industry, it's true, is it not, sir, that the number of 7 engaging in statutory licensed 8 entities webcasting has shrunk substantially since 9 10 2001? Is it not? 11 I don't know if that's true, but I 12 know there are many firms that have entered and built new business models in this industry 13 14 that are brand new and there seemed, from 15 everything I studied, to be no major barriers 16 to entry. 1.7 Name one entity, sir, that entered Q 18 the market for statutory licensed webcasting since 2001. 19 As far as I know, I think Live365 20 21 is a, if it's not brand new, it's entire 22 breadth and operation in the market

1	developed significantly in the last few years.
2	I think the entire market has grown quite a
3	lot in the last few years.
4	Q Let's talk about your testimony
5	just this morning
6	A Right.
7	Q about entry into the market.
8	Live365 I will represent to you participated
9	in the CARP in 2001. They've been around for
10	a while. Can you name any entity, any entity,
11	that has come into the market for statutory
12	licensed webcasting since the initial CARP
13	rate was set in 2002?
14	A I think that any broadcaster, any
15	channel, that has come into the market is
16	brand new. Live365 has, and constantly
17	advertises, it has thousands and thousands of
18	channels, many of them brought to the market
19	by very small entities. Anytime you have
20	someone who decides to become a webcaster and
21	use the Live365 platform, they are a new

entrant into the market. They are providing

the music to customers. There is, the same thing is true of the thousands of channels that are being broadcast to the Rhapsody customers on Radio Pass. Radio Pass has, I believe, over 3,000 channels.

So, I believe any time there is a new webcaster, regardless of exactly the mechanism by which the webcaster delivers a service to the customer, that is entry.

Q Sir, are you suggesting that an individual hobbyist that pays \$10 a month to Live365 or whatever it is, to get its signal delivered through Live365 is comparable in circumstances to the statutory licensed circumstances of AOL or Microsoft or Yahoo?

A It is an entrant that leads to the disciplining of prices. And it's the disciplining of prices that's the hallmark of a competitive model. In other words, if there is an inferior product or too high priced a product, then other people can come in and provide the music. It is very easy to lease

1	capacity band width from Live365 and get on
2	the air. And if you do that,
3	Q Sir
4	A I'm sorry, let me complete my
5	answer. And if you do that, in my mind,
6	you're an entrant into this market. You can
7	be a webcaster. There are many radio stations
8	that are coming online all the time. They are
9	being rebroadcast through subscription
10	channels. So, in my mind, that is and does
11	constitute competitive entry.
12	Q Now could you answer my question?
13	Do you view an individual hobbyist who puts
14	his channel up on Live365 as comparable in
15	circumstance economically to AOL, Yahoo, or
16	Microsoft operating their statutory licensed
17	webcasting operations under this license?
18	A They are no comparable. They are
19	a competitive factor and they are there to
20	discipline the market.
21	Q And how do they discipline the
22	market for the licensing of sound recording
	ł

1	performance rights under the compulsory
2	license when they don't pay the sound
3	recording compulsory license fees?
4	A I'm talking about competition in
5	the market for the delivery and the
6	copyrighted music to the customer, not in
7	terms of the SoundExchange copyright fee.
8	That's set by the was set by the CARP, will
9	be set by this Court.
10	Q Are you familiar with the fact
11	that the individual broadcasters or hobbyists
12	whose channels are aggregated by Live365 don't
13	pay the sound recording royalty Live365 does?
14	A They pay to Live365 fees that
15	Live365 then pays to SoundExchange.
16	Q So the answer is yes, you are
17	familiar with the fact that they don't worry
18	about paying the sound recording royalty fee,
19	they look at what the Live365 fee is to them
20	for getting their channel up. Right?
21	A That doesn't mean they don't worry
22	about what the rate is because the rate flows

through to what they have to pay and that then affects the behavior of competition in the marketplace. It doesn't matter who, whether there's an intermediary that you write the check to, there's still competition in the marketplace.

Q Let's go back to your testimony

just this morning, under oath, about the rapid entry into the market. You've cited individual hobbyists or broadcasters that get their channels up on Live365. Can you name one other company since 2001 that ha launched and entered into the statutory licensed webcasting market?

A My regression had a list of 30 services. Do I -- they included Radio IO, Digital Imported, GotRadio, 3WK, Ultimate 80s, Cross Walk, WOLF FM, Howling Oldies and Super 70s. Do I know when they actually entered the market? No.

Q And even if you knew that they had entered the market before or after, would you

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1	compare any of the economic circumstances of
2	those entities that you just mentioned, to
3	AOL, Yahoo, or Microsoft?
4	A They are different companies.
5	They are going to be different. That doesn't
6	mean there are not competitive factors in the
7	market.
8	Q Just so it's clear, even though
9	you've testified that there's been rapid entry
10	into the market, you can't identify as a
11	matter of fact that has entered the market
12	under the prior CARP rate. Correct?
13	MR. HANDZO: Objection. That
14	misstates his testimony.
15	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Sustained.
16	BY MR. STEINTHAL:
17	Q Can you identify anybody, as a
18	matter of fact?
19	MR. HANDZO: Objection. Asked and
20	answered.
21	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: I assume the
22	question is other than the ones you've already

1	identified?
2	MR. STEINTHAL: Other yes.
3	BY MR. STEINTHAL:
4	Q Other than the ones you've already
5	identified? Fair enough.
6	A Can I identify when they've
7	entered? No. There has been quite a lot of
8	firms entering into this market, which is a
9	very new market.
10	Q And on what do you base your
11	testimony that quite a lot of firms have been
12	entering the market?
13	A On my list of firms and research
14	that was done on who is in the market, how
15	many are in the market, and my knowledge that
16	this business as a whole, as a subscription
17	business, has been developing very rapidly
18	over the last several years. It's essentially
19	something that's discussed in virtually
20	anything you read about the industry.
21	Q When you say subscription
22	business, are you talking about your target

market, your benchmark market or both? 1 I was talking about the target 2 Ά That's what the -- in order to sort 3 of apply this competitive model, I'm assuming 4 that this is the case in both markets. 5 And about this rapid entry. 6 you familiar with the filings in the copyright 7 office indicating the number of entities that 8 are making, excuse me, the number of entities 9 that are availing themselves of the statutory 10 license under Section 114? 11 I don't know of the filings. I do 12 Α 13 know who has paid SoundExchange. Well, are you familiar with the 14 0 15 fact that if you look at the number of 16 entities actually availing themselves of a Section 114 compulsory license, that number 17 18 has dropped precipitously since 2001? 19 I don't know that it would not be consistent with what I've seen from who is 20 21 paying SoundExchange in the last three years. 22 I don't know about 2001. In my mind, that's

	very, that's ancient history in this business,
	given the rapid development. So, I think the
	fact that there have been a large number of
:	firms, a large number of active firms, no
	obvious barriers to entry, says in my mind,
;	that it's reasonable to model this as a
,	competitive industry.
}	JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Excuse me, just
)	for a second. Could you identify for the
)	record where you were reading from in terms of
•	the list of firms used in your regression?
	THE WITNESS: Yes, Judge. This is
	just a list, a table that I constructed of the
:	non-interactive services used in the
	regression, so it's among the different
	documents that we've prepared and provided in
	the case. I don't believe
	JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Is there a tab
	JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Is there a tab that it was
	that it was

1	Sorry.
2	MR. STEINTHAL: I actually was
3	going to mark it as an exhibit shortly, Your
4	Honor, so you can see it.
5	JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Oh, okay.
6	Thank you.
7	BY MR. STEINTHAL:
8	Q Now again, on the subject of the
9	ability to pass along any increase in the
10	royalty rate, dollar for dollar, to the
11	consumer, you testified that, you know, what
12	you did or didn't do with respect to that
13	conclusion. Are you familiar with the fact
14	that the online music industry still faces
15	competition in terms of consumers from free
16	services, such as Kazaa, and eDunky, and other
17	file sharing services?
18	A I would say that there might be
19	some competition for how the consumer spends
20	his or her dollar on music, as a whole, but
21	those are services which, as you said, are

file transfers. So, they become downloads and

1	illegal downloads.
2	Q Well, you're familiar with the
3	fact that a lot of activity goes on by users
4	using those services in obtaining music, are
5	you not?
6	A Absolutely. There is still a lot
7	of piracy taking place. I agree with that.
8	Q Did you take into consideration in
9	your assumption that digital music services
10	could pass along, dollar for dollar, increases
11	in sound recording royalties, the competitive
12	impact in pricing by virtue of the existence
13	of those services?
14	A I think yes. I think I took
15	account of that. That's exactly the nature
16	of, when I talk about a competitive model,
17	the availability of substitute, the legal or
18	illegal effect, what the demand curve looks
19	like, they don't affect the general behavior
20	of firms in a competitive market. It's let
21	me just explain something.
22	You were trying to say that

22

to

competition means you can't pass all of your costs along. Competition is what requires firms and forces firms to essentially price based on cost. And as cost changes, price changes.

Q But sir, you assumed, you said it this morning, that in your target market and in your benchmark market, any increase in the sound recording royalty cost could be passed along, dollar for dollar, to the consumer. Right? Are you with me so far?

A I said that that's the way in which I analytically structured the model.

Yes, I used a competitive industry model.

Correct.

Q Now, what I'm asking you is whether, in making that assumption, it's a valid assumption if in fact, because of the existence of these free services, digital music companies don't feel as if they can pass on all their costs, dollar for dollar, to the consumer?

A That's an absolutely valid
assumption. What you're talking about is how
much demand will change if costs are passed
along. You're also talking about some things
which would affect market equilibrium in the
shorter run, rather than what happens when an
industry shakes and the affects of costs
changes alter the nature and the type of
things being provided. But cost increases get
passed along in a competitive industry, cost
decreases get passed along in a competitive
industry. These are not perfect models
because there's a lot of complexity but as a
working hypothesis and a working model, I
modeled this as a competitive market. I also
modeled it and experimented with this as a
oligopolistic model. And it's a ver complex
set of models, but it would not change my
underlying conclusions.

Q Well, let me ask you this. Did you consider whether some of the prices that are currently being offered in your benchmark

market are lower than they ultimately will be because firms are deliberately pricing their products at a low price point to try to build demand for those new music services precisely to compete with the free Kazaas and the eDunkys and the Groksters?

A They might be doing that just as the target market companies might be doing that. And there is certainly a lot of market building that's going on. But in terms of what prices are now indicating something to us about consumer value in the market, the prices are what they are.

Q But hypothetically, if in fact your benchmark market companies are pricing deliberately at a price point lower than what they expect the price to be to build demand for the product at a time when there are still free services offering file sharing, you'd agree with me, wouldn't you, that if the price in your benchmark market is under what it economically normally would be, then your

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model doesn't capture that difference between 1 the current under-market price and what the 2 market price ultimately will be. Right? 3 It doesn't capture it. I don't Α 4 know what that does to the application of the 5 That would depend on a lot of benchmark. 6 different factors. I, frankly, haven't worked 7 through all of them. 8 So you didn't -- let me ask you 9 Hypothetically, if in fact companies 10 11 engaged in your benchmark market have done a 12 short-term price campaign to build demand and 13 a year from now the prices in your benchmark 14 market were 50 percent higher than they 15 currently are as they settle in in a corrected 16 mode, then you would have a different result 17 from your model. Right? We'd have a different result from 18 Α 19 both the standpoint of the music service and 20 from the standpoint of the music companies.

The -- if we look at the percent of revenue

fee charged in my benchmark market, that's

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tended to stay in the same range, 40 to 50 1 and it's percent, for quite a long time, 2 applied to services that have a range of 3 different retail prices, though it seems to me 4 as if the basic conclusion that the copyright 5 fees in that range of percent of revenue seems 6 7 to be pretty robust. Let me put up one of these charts, 8 so I can make this question a little bit more 9 10 precise. 11 For instance, SoundExchange's demo 12 52. And you calculate, and we'll come back to 13 this in a little bit, but you calculate the 14 difference between what you call the target 15 market, non-interactive webcaster, and the benchmark market, interactive service, 16 17 that's the line three on each of your four 18 examples. Right? 19 Α Yes. 20 that the if it turns out Q So, 21 pricing in the benchmark market is

deliberately at a under-market number now to

1	build demand, and that in fact the market
2	price, once it settles, for example 150
3	percent or 200 percent of the numbers you have
4	in your line two, then the ratio is going to
5	shrink. Correct?
6	A The ratio would shrink, assuming
7	that the same type of thing is not going on in
8	the target market, there is not the same
9	effort by the same type of companies to build
10	their business in those markets.
11	Q Now I believe you relied, in your
12	testimony, on the elasticity of demand
13	assumption that I asked you about a few
14	moments ago, on an article by Alexander
15	Belinfante. Right?
16	A That is the article that I relied
17	on, but not for that assumption.
18	Q What did you rely on it for?
19	A I relied on it as one of the
20	things, one of the pieces of evidence that the
21	demand elasticity for an individual CD is very

low.

Q Okay. And that study related to
demand elasticity as between individual CDs
not as between online music services.
Correct?
A Between or for online music
service, yes.
Q Indeed, the study was conducted in
1977, was it not?
A The study was conducted in 1977.
It's the only article that I am aware of and
I talked to Dr. Belinfante, that he's aware
of, that's conducted such an estimate.
Q Let me ask you to take a look at
Services Exhibit 60. It's the Belinfante
article.
And can you identify this as the Belinfante
article upon which you relied?
A Upon which I relied? Yes.
(Whereupon, the document
referred to as Services
Exhibit No. 60 was marked
for identification.)

1	MR. STEINTHAL: I would offer
2	Services Exhibit 60 into evidence.
3	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Any objection
4	to the Exhibit?
5	MR. HANDZO: No objection.
6	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Without
7	objection, Exhibit 60 is admitted.
8	(Whereupon, the document
9	marked as Services
10	Exhibit No. 60 for
11	identification was
12	received into evidence.)
13	BY MR. STEINTHAL:
14	Q Take a look, if you would, at
15	page, the third page of the document. That
16	would be page 59, if you look in the upper
17	left-hand corner of the book or periodical
18	from which it was obtained.
19	A Now, there's a 49. There's a
20	third sheet, the upper left-hand corner shows
21	a 50.
22	Q All right. I thought it was 59.

Only my It's my eyes. Sorry. 1 50, okav. It's the first thing to go. 2 There's a paragraph on the bottom 3 left of this page. It reads, as expected, the 4 variable introduced to measure taste, QS, 5 proved to be the most significant one in the 6 model, as is shown by its T value. This also 7 indicates the importance of the use of singles 8 9 as a way of promoting the sales of an album. The second most significant variable was RC, 10 11 revealing the importance of radio play and 12 live concerts in giving exposure to a record. 13 Do you have any reason to dispute the validity of that finding? 14 15 Α Not for the and purposes 16 interpretation of the equation as given by the 17 authors. 18 By the way when you testified 0 19 earlier that your regression analysis had a 90 some-odd percent confidence level, 20 that assumes your inputs and assumptions underlying 21 22 the model are correct. Is it not?

A It assumes that the yes, it
assumes quite that it's a meaningful
regression and that the data is accurate and
I've captured and specified the
equation properly. I agree.
Q All right. Let's go to the
regression, if we can. Let's take a look at
the document that you're referring to and see
whether I've got the right document. Copy for
the bench so they can see it.
Marked as Services Exhibit 61 is a
document bearing Bate-stamped number SX113974
through 113978.
Is this the document you referred
to earlier as the document containing the
inputs in your regression analysis?
A Yes, it is.
(Whereupon, the document
referred to as Services
Exhibit No. 61 was
marked
for identification.)

б

#### BY MR. STEINTHAL: 1 Now, turn to the first page, if Q The first couple of 3 would. you represent the universe of services you looked 4 at in conducting your regression. Is that 5 6 right? They are the inputs. Those are 7 Α the universe, the population, yes. 8 9 this represented the 0 And services broadly 10 subscription that were 11 available for purposes of your regression 12 analysis. Correct? 13 Yes. Α First of all, I want to make sure 14 Q 15 we understand each other when we talk about 16 what is statutory licensed webcasting service for purposes of your target market and what 17 isn't. 18 19 In your written testimony on pages 20 7 to 8 you said, in reference to what is non-21 interactive webcasting in your target market,

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1	A Right.
2	Q you state at the very bottom of
3	page 7, for purposes of this analysis, I have
4	presumed that non-interactive webcasting does
5	not permit any form of user input to customize
6	particular stations. Correct?
7	A Right.
8	Q So I gather, if a station or a
9	service was delivering internet radio that
10	incorporated artist preferences, you would
11	keep that out of your target market analysis?
12	A Well the target market means the
13	market that is eligible for the statutory
14	license. So, it would not be eligible for a
15	statutory license. It does not mean it would
16	not be in the regression. The regression
17	includes all subscription music services,
18	whether they're in or outside of the statutory
19	license.
20	Q Okay. But when you do your
21	comparison of values of target market
22	statutory licensed webcasters to interactive,

you would want to make sure that you were
comparing statutory license compliance
services to benchmark market services.
Correct?
A Ideally, I would. But I did
include in the regression some that are not
purely non-interactive. That would be true of
Launchcast Plus.
Q Well, let's take the ones right up
there on your 6.2. Launchcast Plus, you would
acknowledge, would you not, is deemed by the
recording industry to be not in compliance
with the statutory license. Right?
A Correct.
Q So, if you look at that \$3.99
figure that you use for purposes of the ration
in your modeling, that \$3.99 actually
overstates to some degree the value of a
statutory license service. Correct?
A Well, to some degree that I could
not measure, yes, I agree.
Q Now, Musicmatch Gold, do you know

1	how that service works?
2	A That also, I believe, has some
3	non-statutory features.
4	Q So again, that \$4.95 includes some
5	measure of value outside of the statutory
6	license that you were unable to measure.
7	Correct?
8	A Yes.
9	Q And Rhapsody Radio, isn't that a
10	service which enables you to put up to ten
11	artists into your desired preference streams
12	before you get into your stations?
13	A That I wasn't sure of. I had
14	my understanding was that Rhapsody Radio was
15	a statutory service.
16	Q Well, can you tell us what in fact
17	the features of Rhapsody Radio are?
18	A The features are primarily, it's a
19	streaming, you know, a streaming service
20	similar to many other non-interactive services
21	in their basic characteristics, which is a
22	programed set of music that's delivered to the

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1	customer.
2	Q Well, do you know whether it has
3	skipping, for example?
4	A I believe it might, which I think
5	is sort of a controversial issue on which side
6	of the line skipping is. Is it non-
7	interactive or not? I understand that to be
8	an issue that is still not resolved.
9	Q Is it fair to say that as you sit
10	here today, you don't know whether Rhapsody
11	Radio includes certain consumer influence
12	features that the recording industry believes
13	can render it outside the statutory license?
14	A I don't recall.
15	Q All right, let's go to your
16	Exhibit 61.
17	A Oh, okay.
18	Q Live365 VIP, that one's got the
19	big 10,000 station input factor. Those are
20	the that's because it's an aggregator. Is
21	that right?
22	A It is a service that provides more

1	than 10,000 stations. It's actually more than
2	10,000.
3	Q But it doesn't program them
4	themselves, it basically aggregates. I mean,
5	the vast majority of those 10,000 are
6	individual broadcasters or hobbyists whose
7	streams are aggregated and then delivered by
8	Live365. Correct?
9	A Yes.
LO	Q Now, the entity here at 19 and 20,
L1	DI Gold and DI Platinum,
L2	A Yes.
L3	Q do you know what that stands
L4	for, what the real name of the service is?
L5	A I believe it's Digital
L6	Interactive, but I don't
L7	Q Digitally Imported ring a bell?
18	A Oh, I think it does. Let me
9	Digitally Imported, yes. Sorry.
20	Q Did you know that the price for
21	their subscription service, since the time you
22	did your regression analysis, has been dropped

to \$4.95 a month? 1 That actually would I didn't. 2 Α improve my regression results. 3 Well, it would ultimately result 4 0 in lowering the average, would it not, of the 5 non-subscription services and thus increasing 6 the disparity between non-interactive services 7 -- I think I misspoke with the word non-8 9 subscription. Let me rephrase it. It's true, is it not that if price 10 11 was dropped to \$4.95, it would increase the ratio between non-interactive services that 12 13 are under the statutory license and your 14 target market -- I mean, I'm sorry, and your 15 benchmark market. Correct? 16 It might change the ratio, 17 that doesn't tell you what the regression 18 would do. I ran regressions without Digitally Imported, without some of the sort of small 19 20 services. And, in fact, if you look at -- I'd

have to check exactly what was in and outside

of this in the last page of the exhibit you

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gave me.

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regression where Ι That is a dropped eight of the observations from the sample. Let's see it says -- sorry -- seven of the observations from the sample. You can tell that by seeing under sort of the top of the page, it says, there's a column that says source and then there's DF. DF is degrees of freedom and the degrees of freedom have fallen fewer here, so that means there are observations that are being used regression.

And when I pull out some of the smaller services, if you look farther down under the regression results where the table that says parameter estimates under the variable for on-demand, the parameter estimate is 0.55 and the one from the regression I use in the testimony is 0.60. So, 0.55 says that the interactive services are worth 55 percent more, rather than 60 percent more.

O Now, you didn't wait --

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1	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Mr.
2	Steinthal, let me interrupt you just a minute.
3	Ten minutes ago, when you
4	testified about the passing along the cost to
5	the consumers and then you went into the same
6	question that has just been asked about the
7	affect of subscription prices to the ratio, I
8	got a little puzzled then and your last
9	question increased my confusion. So, let me
10	just see if I'm straightened out.
11	If the subscription price goes up,
12	what does that do to the ratio?
13	THE WITNESS: To the ratio of the
14	fee to price of the service, sir, Your Honor?
15	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Yes, this
16	ratio.
17	THE WITNESS: That would depend on
18	whether it's a statutory or non-statutory
19	service. If it's a statutory service, the fee
20	ratio would go down as the price goes up. If
21	it's a non-statutory service and there's a
22	percentage of revenue as part of the contract

1	and that is what governs what is paid, then it
2	would stay the same.
3	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: And if the
4	ratio goes down, your recommended rate in your
5	model goes down?
6	THE WITNESS: The ratio goes down
7	in the benchmark market and that would be the
8	and that indeed is what was reflected in
9	the market and that is indeed what the overall
10	evidence would say. Yes, it would.
11	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Thank you.
12	BY MR. STEINTHAL:
13	Q Sir, in doing your regression, and
14	taking in the data from the companies listed
15	on Exhibit 61, you didn't weight the services
16	by any measure such as how frequently users
17	actually used one service against the other.
18	Correct?
19	A In the regression, I did not. But
20	I say that with respect to the overall result,
21	it doesn't seem to matter.
22	Q And if you turn to the flip side

1	of the first page, the second page,
2	A We're on?
3	Q of your regression?
4	A The second page, sir?
5	Q Yes.
6	A Okay.
7	Q You included XM Radio Online. Is
8	that the satellite radio service that offers
9	several of its stations in an online
10	webcasting format?
11	A That's correct.
12	Q Now, let's see. On 6.2, we talked
13	about the issue with respect to Yahoos, Music
14	Matches, and Rhapsodies radio products. Let
15	me ask you about Radio Free Virgin and Virgin
16	Digital.
17	Are you familiar with the fact
18	that Virgin Digital is a product that is
19	primarily marketed in the UK and not in the
20	US?
21	A It is available if you it's
22	available in the US. That part that's what

1	I based this on. This is a service available
2	in the US. I don't know where else and how
3	it's marketed and I did not try to measure
4	where the marketing efforts are.
5	Q Would it surprise you to know that
6	there are less than 1,000 or approximately
7	1,000 Virgin Digital US subscribers?
8	A No.
9	Q Now, in doing your comparative
10	analysis to get the ratios that you used for
11	your model, you used the non-interactive
12	services as against the non-portable
13	interactive services. Right?
14	A Correct.
15	Q Now, are you familiar with the
16	fact, sir, that under the statutory license,
17	webcasters operating under the statutory
18	license can deliver their services and it
19	doesn't matter whether the consumer accesses
20	those streams on their computers or portable
21	devices that may be internet enabled?

Α

Yes.

1	Q And they pay the same rate, either
2	way. Correct?
3	A Yes.
4	Q Now, wouldn't it be more apples
5	and apples for purposes of calculating your
6	line three ratios to look at the prices for
7	the non-interactive statutory webcasters which
8	are able to deliver to portable devices as
9	compared to subscription interactive on-demand
10	services that are also able to deliver to
11	portable devices?
12	A If I wanted to, which I didn't,
13	come up with a rate that I said should apply
14	to both portable and non-portable as a
15	recommendation for a statutory rate, then I'd
16	want to use a blend of the portable and non-
17	portable services. I so, I think this is
18	a two-step process, rather than your question
19	implying I should have put them all together.
20	Q And if you had looked either at a
21	blended price for portable and non-portable or
22	just the portable interactive services, then

1	the ration would increase, wouldn't it?
2	A The ratio?
3	Q The line three ratio on 6.2?
4	A The ratio would decrease.
5	Q I'm sorry, the ratio would
6	decrease. You'd go from one to two, to one to
7	three, or one to four. Something like that,
8	right?
9	A Something like that.
10	Q And you actually have some of the
11	monthly prices for the portable services in
12	your other report. It's anywhere from \$11.99
13	to \$14.99, isn't it?
14	A I would, I would yes, I have
15	them. I could have done it that way. I could
16	have gotten a lower ratio there. I could have
17	then applied it to a larger consumer price and
18	also to then applied it to the rates being
19	paid by the, in the interactive contracts for
20	the portable services. So, all of the ratios
21	and all of the numbers would have been
22	different. This would have gone down. It

1	would have been applied to a larger number,
2	and that then would have been applied to a
3	larger number. And the number would have been
4	larger.
5	Q Sir, as I'm looking at attachment
6	Appendix 80, a written report, which is the 17
7	contracts that you used to calculate the
8	benchmark market subscription rate,
9	A Right.
10	Q I just want to be sure I'm
11	getting this right. There are 5 of the 17
12	agreements upon which you rely go back to
13	2002, do they not?
14	A Yes. Let me just double check.
15	One, two, three, four one, two, three,
16	four, five. Yes.
17	Q And since the exhibit itself
18	doesn't show it hold on a second.
19	It's true, is it not, that if you
20	stratify the 17 agreements by entity that
21	actually negotiated with and entered into
22	licenses with the labels underlying this

1	appendix, if I do my math right, four are
2	MusicNet. Correct?
3	A One, two, three, one, two,
4	three yes.
5	Q And four are Musicmatch before it
6	was acquired by Yahoo?
7	A I'm not sure about the contract
8	from 10/15/04. I think the acquisition, the
9	close of the acquisition was in that month.
10	So, it could be right before or right after.
11	Q And the others are definitely
12	before?
13	A The others are before the
14	acquisition. I'm not sure if they're before
15	the announcement of the acquisition.
16	Q And four from Napster LLC?
17	A Four from one, two, three
18	four from Napster, correct.
19	Q Two from Real Networks?
20	A Two from Real Rhapsody Real
21	Networks, yes.
22	Q And three from MusicNow. Correct?

1	A One, two, three from MusicNow. Or
2	did we say four? I didn't
3	Q I said three from MusicNow.
4	A Okay. I got three. I was going
5	to have to go back if you said four.
6	Q And that was MusicNow before it
7	was acquired by AOL very recently. Correct?
8	A I believe so. I believe that's
9	correct, yes. The acquisition is
10	Q Sir, turning to a different
11	subject, substitution and promotion for a
12	minute. Okay?
13	On page 51 of your statement, you
14	testify, do you not, that you have found no
15	empirical support for either position, meaning
16	the proposition that statutory licensed
17	webcasting is promotional of sound recording
18	sales or that it substitutes for sound
19	recording sales. Is that a fair statement?
20	A Again, this is all with respect to
21	the relative substitutability of non-
22	interactive and interactive. But that's what

1	I said with respect to that relationship.
2	Q Well, it's true that you found no
3	empirical support for the proposition that
4	statutory licensed webcasting substitutes for
5	sound recording sales. Correct?
6	A No. I said it provided no
7	empirical support that one was more than the
8	other. If you look at the beginning of the
9	paragraph, it says I have seen no evidence to
10	suggest there is any difference between these
11	two markets with respect to their promotional
12	or substitutional effects.
13	Q Well, did you find any empirical
14	evidence that in fact statutory licensed
15	webcasting substitutes for sound recording
16	sales?
17	A I did not.
18	Q And you looked for it, didn't you?
19	A I looked for evidence on
20	substitution in general. I didn't find any
21	measurements of substitution effects. In
22	particular, as I said, and the point I make in

1	my testimony which is what's relevant for my
2	modeling is whether there's a difference in
3	the substitution effects for the bench
4	between the benchmark and the target market.
5	Q But you were looking for it in
6	both ways. You were looking for it and found
7	no empirical evidence of substitution.
8	Correct?
9	A I was looking something that would
10	let me compare the substitution effects in the
11	benchmark and the target markets. I found
12	nothing that would allow me to measure that
13	difference.
14	Q And you found nothing, just to be
15	precise, that enabled you to measure what
16	extent, if at all, statutory licensed
17	webcasting is in fact substitutional sound
18	recording sales. Correct?
19	A Nothing that would let me measure
20	it. That's correct.
21	Q Now, you testified yesterday that
22	your research materials included Arbitron

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1	publications. Correct?
2	A Yes.
3	Q Let mark this as Services Exhibit
4	62, Arbitron Report entitled "Internet 9 The
5	Media and Entertainment World of Online
6	Consumers."
7	Is this, one of the Arbitron
8	reports of the nature that you reviewed in
9	connection with your research?
10	A Yes.
11	(Whereupon, the document
12	referred to as Services
13	Exhibit No. 62 was
14	marked
15	for identification.)
16	MR. STEINTHAL: I offer Exhibit 62
17	into evidence.
18	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Any objection
19	to Exhibit 62?
20	MR. HANDZO: Well, I would ask for
21	a further foundation. Mr. Steinthal asked
22	whether it was of the nature that he reviewed.

1	I would want tot know whether this is one that
2	he reviewed before we go any further.
3	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Mr.
4	Steinthal?
5	BY MR. STEINTHAL:
6	Q Do you know whether this was or
7	wasn't one of the ones you reviewed?
8	A I believe it was, there were
9	several years worth of this study. So, I
10	believe I looked at this one. I might have
11	focused on the more recent ones. But I can't
12	say for 100 percent sure I looked at his
13	particular one. I looked at several of this
14	titled report of different vintages.
15	MR. HANDZO: No objection.
16	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Without
17	objection, Exhibit 62 is admitted.
18	(Whereupon, the document
19	marked as Services
20	Exhibit No. 62 for
21	identification was
22	received into evidence.)

#### BY MR. STEINTHAL: 1 the of 2 0 On the second page 3 document, --Is that including the cover page 4 or not? 5 O Yes. The overview. 6 7 Ά Okay. Ninth the 8 0 says welcome to Study 9 Arbitron Edison Media Research Use of Streaming Media and the 10 Consumers 11 Internet with brand new data from interviews 12 conducted in July 2002. We have conducted 13 these studies every six months since August of 14 1998 and our semi-annual reports have become 1.5 widely used sources of information 16 streaming media and consumer behavior on the 17 internet. Is that consistent with your 1.8 understanding of how the Arbitron reports are 19 generally used in the industry? 20 In terms of how they're used, it Α It doesn't tell 21 says they are widely used. 22 you how they're used. And I don't think

1	Aribtron would know, necessarily what everyone
2	uses them for.
3	Q But they are widely distributed
4	and used, to your knowledge?
5	A To my knowledge, they are.
6	Q Take a look, if you would, at page
7	14, paragraph 25. People who stream
8	frequently buy significantly more CDs than
9	most Americans. Some have mistakenly equated
10	the rise of streaming audio with a decrease in
11	record purchases. However, the data show that
12	the more streamees (those streaming in the
13	last month and last week) were also the group
14	that purchased the greatest number of CDs in
15	the past year. The average American purchased
16	13 CDs in the past year, while those that have
17	ever streamed have purchased 15 CDs. Monthly
18	streamees report that they bought an average
19	18 CDs and weekly streamees say they have
20	purchased nearly 21 CDs in the past year.
21	Did you make any reference to this
22	particular finding in the Arbitron reports in

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connection with your research?

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I think did review this and Α one that gives somewhat later there's But I did look at this. different data. did take account of it. And I can tell you why it does not tell me anything that I could use to quantify what I want to quantify. And there are two reasons for that. One is, it It's not clear whether this says streamees. is interactive or non-interactive streamees. There was nothing in the report that let me come to a conclusion on that. So, it doesn't help at all.

Secondly, even to the extent a report would survey customers who are streamees of a particular type and compare them to other customers. It does not tell you — those can be two different types of customers.

Suppose it were true that, just to take an example, high income people buy more CDs and it's also true that high income people

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

tend to be streamees. Then all you've found
is the correlation between the two, you
haven't found the fact that streaming is what
itself leads to more or fewer purchases of
CDs.
Q Sir, this report was done in 2002.
Right?
A Yes.
Q Do you know how many, if any, of
your benchmark market services were actually
operating in 2002?
A I don't know.
Q Would it surprise you to know that
the earliest licenses that were secured were
in 2001 and then in 2002? And that these
services didn't launch commercially available
interactive streaming and on-demand services
until after the Arbitron report?
A I didn't know that.
Q Would that affect the conclusion?
A That would affect the issue of
whether this report could be used to just deal

with streamees. I would still be very hesitant to draw any conclusion about different types of streamees, whether they're interactive or non-interactive based on a 2002 report.

And, finally, and I can say this again very firmly, it is very important when you're doing surveys to try to evaluate things, that you don't mistake correlation with causation. If you just ask a certain set of people are you of this type and do you do more of this? That tells you nothing about the influence of the two behaviors you see of

Q At the end of the day, though, you don't have any reason to dispute the finding here, you just don't know the specific underlying data points. Correct?

A Well, the finding is that people that stream more, that the streamers buy more CDs. That is not a finding that people that streaming leads to greater CD purchases. It

one each other.

1.8

1	doesn't tell you whether they bought more CDs
2	before they were streamers or fewer CDs before
3	they were streamers. It doesn't relate the
4	streaming to increased purchases of CDs. It
5	just relates it to people that happen to buy
6	more CDs.
7	Q It doesn't suggest that people who
8	are streaming are not buying as many CDs as
9	they used to, does it?
10	A It doesn't suggest anything in
11	terms of what the affect of streaming is on CD
12	purchases.
13	Q Now, you made an assumption that
14	you testified about yesterday that subscribing
15	to the benchmark on-demand services could to
16	lead to two less CD purchases per year.
17	Correct?
18	A Yes.
19	Q And you adjusted for that in the
20	manner that you testified about?
21	A Right. And again, this is all
22	relationship, not that it will lead to two CDs

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1	but that versus subscribing to a interactive
2	or non-interactive, would lead to two more CDs
3	being purchased.
4	Q And the number two, where did the
5	number two come from?
6	A Actually, I believe it was
7	suggested to me by counsel to see whether,
8	just to test it out in a simulation analysis.
9	Uhm
10	Q Now sorry.
11	A I was just going to say, it seemed
12	like a reasonable assumption to me at the
13	time.
14	Q Now, from the label's perspective,
15	focusing on your benchmark market on-demand
16	services, they're collecting on average, or
17	the services are collecting, on average \$8.29
18	per subscriber. Right? That was your
19	finding?
20	A That was my that was the
21	average price I used. Correct.
22	Q And based on the greater of

1	formulation and the 47.7 percent rev share, I
2	think it's fair to say, is it not, that
3	approximately \$4 of that \$8.29 would be
4	expected to flow through to the labels?
5	A I'll accept that.
6	Q At a minimum?
7	A Well, yes. It depends exactly how
8	the percentage of revenue applies, but
9	something like that.
10	Q Okay. Let's \$4 because it's nice
11	and round.
12	A I'm fine with round numbers.
13	Q So that means that the labels are
14	getting \$48 a year from those people that are
15	now subscribing to these on-demand streaming
16	conditional down-load services. Right?
17	A Right.
18	Q And if all they are losing from a
19	substitutional standpoint is two CDs a year,
20	if you calculate it, they'd be losing a little
21	bit over \$10 and \$11 in income by virtue of

that substitutional effect.

A	Yes,	at	\$11	.20,	yes.

Q Now, that would put the labels way
ahead, wouldn't it? I mean, they're getting
\$48 that they didn't have before by these on-
demand, streaming limited download services
and, with the two CD assumption, only losing
two CDs a year. So, they're coming away
pretty well off by this new form of
distribution. Right? It's \$48 minus \$10.50,
so they come away with \$36 and change more
than they had before. Correct?

A I would expect that to be true and I think that's entirely logical to suggest that's what is going on. Otherwise, they would not -- if they're not going to make much on these services, they're not going to be very intent to set the price where they do.

Q Well but isn't it true, sir, from an economic perspective, they're ahead of the game, even if those interactive services had a substitutional impact of up to six or seven CDs a year, or more than that?

1	A Well I think we let's get the		
2	numbers right.		
3	Q Well, if they're making \$48 they		
4	didn't have before,		
5	A Right.		
6	Q and they're losing		
7	A A little over four CDs would be		
8	where they'd four times, let's use \$12,		
9	round the \$11.20		
10	Q No, no, let's take on an income		
11	perspective		
12	A \$11.20.		
13	Q you used \$5 whatever it was, \$5		
14			
15	A I used \$11 I'm sorry. You're		
16	right. \$5, you're right, absolutely.		
17	Q So it would be seven or eight CDs		
18			
19	A Yes.		
20	Q that, even if those services		
21	caused a substitutional impact of seven or		
22	eight CDs, the labels are ahead of the game.		
	1		

Right?

A Well, ahead of the game meaning they make money on this service where above and beyond what they were otherwise making, yes. They're making money from their different and new use of their copyrighted material.

Q Well, my question is really, why two? Why not consider a higher number associated with the substitutional impact of your benchmark market services, given the fact that the labels are getting that \$48 instead of the substituted four CDs?

A Well, I think there are number of reasons for this. First, if you start to make this number much bigger, and we're doing some rounding here, so I could quarrel with exactly how much of the margin is accounted for by the loss of CD sales, but if you make it too big, you're positing that the record companies are choosing to set a price for use of their music and interactive webcasting which yields them

a very small margin. And it doesn't make sense that they would be satisfied with a very small margin, if that's what is happening at that price. They'd try to raise the price and as long as they don't cause a significant, an overwhelming repression of demand, they're going to make more money. The smaller your margin, the more you're going to want to raise your price because it doesn't cost you that much when you lose customers. So, that's number one.

Number two, two CD sales is a lot. Even though the Arbitron data you showed me and that I really initially reviewed showed average CD sales of about ten per customer, and higher numbers for certain classes of customers, I think that's a vast overestimate of the actual average annual CD purchases, if you look at shipments of CDs in the United States.

Q The bottom line is you chose two because counsel recommended it --

#### NEAL R. GROSS

1	A I
2	Q and there's a big difference
3	between two and whatever number of CDs these
4	labels could afford to have substituted for
5	and still have a margin associated with your
6	benchmark market services. Correct?
7	A There is still, I agree there is
8	still a margin. I agree that there's a good
9	margin. And I agree that I chose two because
10	counsel suggested it. I also testify that
11	two, in my mind, is a very large number
12	relative to what we see of CD sales in the
13	country.
14	Q You are aware, are you not, that
15	record companies are making promotional
16	expenditures to promote air play of their
17	records by webcasters?
18	A Yes.
19	Q And that indicates to you, does it
20	not, that record company representatives
21	believe that those expenditures will result in
22	an increase in sales of recorded music.

	1 0
	1 ((0777-07-7)
- 1	Correct?

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A Yes.

Q Now, in your adjustments that you make in connection with your model, you don't seek to capture or make any adjustment for that promotional value of statutory licensed webcasting, do you?

I -- let's see for a second. The Ι addressed in promotional what ΜV testimony is what I called net substitution or So the two CD difference is an promotion. attempt to show through simulation what would be the effect on my recommendation if I had a two CD positive difference which could either be through increased substitution from the benchmark, could be from increased orSo, it considers promotion from the target. both ends of that. I just want to make sure that's clear.

Q But you didn't consider explicitly, on a standalone basis, what affect that promotional value had on your model or on

1	the rate setting in this proceeding. Correct?
2	A I did not have, and similar to the
3	substitution numbers we were talking about, I
4	did not have any evidence of the extent to
5	which webcasting, in general, promotes the
6	sale of CD records. I'm not talking about
7	promotion of the particular hit albums, I'r
8	talking about the overall change in CD sales
9	that would be expected by the record company
10	as a result of having more customers
11	subscribing to statutory webcasting services
12	Q You'd agree, through, as a matter
13	of just math, that if that relative two CI
14	assumption you made was larger, then that
15	would have an affect on what the rate is that
16	you would recommend to the panel. Correct?
17	A Yes.
18	Q And the larger that substitutional
19	differential, the lower the fee. Correct?
20	A Yes.
21	Q Turn, if you will, to page 18 of
	1

your written testimony. This is where you

1	discussed the musical work, the benchmark.
2	A Yes.
3	Q First of all, the reference in the
4	first full paragraph on this page, where
5	you're talking about music services providing
6	interactive DATs, license fees for sound
7	recordings in the range that you put in your
8	testimony here, that's a direct reference to
9	your, what we talked about earlier, your
10	benchmark market interactive on-demand
11	streaming services. Right?
12	A Yes.
13	Q And the comparison that you make
14	and that you refer to in your footnote with
15	respect to musical works, that's the musical
16	work rate associated with those on-demand
17	streaming conditional download services and
18	the mechanical music licensing aspects
19	thereof. Correct?
20	A The performance and the
21	mechanical, yes.

You're familiar with the fact that

1	there's a difference between the mechanical
2	reproduction rights and the performance
3	rights?
4	A Yes, I am. And I think the
5	footnote discusses the dispute over whether a
6	mechanical fee applies or not.
7	Q Well, you know, don't you, that
8	there's no dispute over the application of the
9	mechanical royalty fee to conditional
10	downloads and permanent downloads?
11	A I wasn't sure about the
12	conditional downloads. I'll take your word
13	for it.
14	Q The dispute that you referred to
15	is whether or not there is a mechanical
16	reproduction in the delivery of an on-demand
17	stream. Right?
18	A Of an on-demand stream but then I
19	said here in the footnote, performance and
20	musical works by interactive services.
21	Q So this discussion here is in
22	relation to the musical work situation as it

1	pertains to on-demand streaming, conditional
2	download services, and actually permanent
3	download services, too. Right?
4	A Which part of the discussion? The
5	discussion in general is referring to the
6	amounts paid to the musical work copyright
7	holder for interactive services and it, as I
8	said in the footnote, it gives a range
9	depending on different interpretations of the
10	mechanical license fee of somewhere between
11	dispute ranging between 6.9 percent and 14
12	percent.
13	Q And that's what you read from this
14	article that you pulled up?
15	A Yes.
16	Q Now, so it's clear that the whole
17	discussion doesn't deal with the rates that
18	prevail for non-interactive statutory
19	webcasting services. Correct?
20	A I'm not exactly sure what your
21	question is.
22	Q The discussion doesn't relate to

1	musical work performance fees for non-
2	interactive statutory licensed webcasting.
3	Correct.
4	A This is pointing to markers
5	comparing where there are both of them
6	negotiated in the market. So, at this point
7	in the testimony, I only am referring to the
8	interactive. That's correct. Okay.
9	Q Now, You make a statement on this
10	page that differentiates between the factors
11	of production depending on their scarcity
12	value and then you say, to the extent that
13	popular recording artists are scarcer than
14	musical composers, the returns to the
15	recording artist will be higher. Do you see
16	that?
17	A I do.
18	Q You're familiar with the fact, I
19	think you actually may have testified to it a
20	little bit, that there are many songs that are
21	recorded by multiple people?
22	A Yes.

1	Q If I had a song that was recorded
2	by 20 different people and I wanted to have a
3	performance of that song, I could choose from
4	any one of 20 renditions of it. Correct?
5	A If I wanted to purchase it as a
6	consumer? I'm sorry, I know it's a little
7	Q Whether you wanted to purchase it
8	as a consumer as a download or whether you
9	want to hear it as an interactive stream, if
10	there are 20 different versions of a song and
11	I'm neutral as to the performance, then which
12	is scarcer, the song or the performed version
13	thereof?
14	A If you're neutral then it's not
15	very scarce. If a customer is just as willing
16	to buy a song recorded by you versus Barry
17	Manilow, then, you know, Barry Manilow is not
18	going to get a lot of money for recording
19	music.
20	Q Well then, as a practical matter,
21	neither musical works nor sound recordings are
22	scarce. Correct?

from the Thev scarce 1 are the how they're valued in standpoint of 2 3 market. There is talent and what we're 4 talking about is scarce talent. It's the same 5 6 thing that operates in any market where there 7 are anyone can do it but not everyone can do I could play professional 8 it well. So, basketball just as well as LeBron James but I 9 doubt I would get the same compensation he 10 11 gets. So, LeBron James is scarce. 12 You wouldn't get any compensation, Q would you? You wouldn't be in that market 13 because you're not in that market. 14 15 Α Ιf the market is exclusively 16 professional basketball, that's correct, I wouldn't be in it. 17 1.8 Q Now, you then make a reference to screenwriters, actors and directors as a point 19 Now, just to be 2.0 of your rationale here. clear, screenwriters, actors and directors are 21 not licensed on a blanket license basis. 22

1	Correct?
2	A Correct.
3	Q So, individual negotiations occur
4	between whether it be motion picture or TV
5	companies and individual actors, directors and
6	scriptwriters over their primary compensation.
7	Correct?
8	A Yes. I mean, there's union
9	affects but, in general, I agree with you.
10	Q I want to ask you some questions
11	about your testimony about the mobile premium.
12	First of all, you'd agree that
13	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Mr.
14	Steinthal, before you go into that, you want
15	to take a recess for now?
16	MR. STEINTHAL: Sure.
17	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Recess for
18	ten minutes.
19	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter
20	went off the record at 11:02 a.m. and went
21	back on the record at 11:14 a.m.)
22	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: We'll come to

1	order.
2	CROSS-EXAMINATION (CONT'D)
3	BY MR. STEINTHAL:
4	Q Dr. Pelcovits, questions about
5	mobile for a moment. Would you agree with the
6	proposition that the market for delivery
7	through mobile devices of webcast services is
8	a relatively new market?
9	A Yes.
10	Q Do you know exactly how new?
11	A Not specifically, no.
12	Q It's within the last several
13	months, isn't it?
14	A I believe that's correct. I was
15	going to say within the last year or so.
16	Q Now, is it correct that you have
17	to be, as an economist, cautionary about
18	making any broad economic assumptions based on
19	data from an immature market?
20	A I think there's limits, to some
21	extent, what you can say about it. I would
22	agree that you want more data and more

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1	information, if possible, in making
2	conclusions, yes.
3	Q Isn't it true that pricing in new
4	markets can sometimes fluctuate wildly in the
5	first two or three years of a market?
6	A Yes, it can fluctuate, absolutely,
7	as products are being introduced and brought
8	to market, yes.
9	Q And is one of the things that can
10	lead to fluctuations in price as more and more
11	companies become engaged in the supply of
12	similar product?
13	A That's the competition in entry we
14	were talking about earlier. So, you've come
15	around to my side.
16	Q So, the answer is yes, is it not?
17	A Yes.
18	Q And are you familiar with the fact
19	that in the mobile business, in particular,
20	there has been a lot of different products
21	flowing into the market year by year?
22	A In the mobile market?

1	Q Yes.
2	A You're talking about mobile music
3	or just mobile in general?
4	Q Mobile telephony product-wise?
5	A Oh, sure.
6	Q And there are competing offerings
7	by mobile companies of different content that
8	people can subscribe to. Correct?
9	A Content, varieties of accessing
10	content. There's a lot of things going on in
11	the market, yes.
12	Q And a lot of that is emerging as
13	we speak. Correct?
14	A Yes.
15	Q Now, I believe on page 61 of your
16	testimony and then in your direct, you talked
<b>L</b> 7	about the inadequacy, maybe inadequacy is the
L8	wrong word, the lack of a lot of observations
19	of data upon which you could rely. Correct?
20	A Yes.
21	Q In your written statement you say
22	the data is not rich enough, those are your

1	words, and then I think on your direct
2	testimony you said that you didn't have enough
3	observations upon which to make a conclusion
4	about mobile rates relative to other rates.
5	Correct?
6	A No. I said that I did not have
7	enough observations in order to extend the
8	hedonic regression. It didn't mean I couldn't
9	draw some conclusion that they are priced in
10	the market generally higher than the non-
11	mobile services.
12	Q Well, I think you said that six
13	observations were what you had for mobile and
14	they're the ones on page 60 of your testimony.
15	Is that right?
16	A That's correct.
17	Q If six observations are not enough
18	for you to do a regression analysis is that
19	what I understood you to say?
20	A It depends. I mean, you have to
21	try. We did try the regression analysis and
22	it didn't give anything meaningful. There was

1	not enough power in the regression to come up
2	with a significant coefficient estimate.
3	Q Well, if six observations aren't
4	enough, is there a rule of thumb to any degree
5	of how many observations you need to conduct
6	a regression that you can have any confidence
7	in?
8	A No.
9	Q Is it typically more than six?
10	A It depends on what you're trying
11	to regress. If you're trying to, you know,
12	look at a time trend for five years of, you
13	know, production of a particular product in a
14	new country, you might be able to do a
15	regression. You're essentially drawing a
16	straight line. People do it all the time and
17	they draw conclusions from it. So, six is not
18	necessarily insufficient. In this case it
19	was.
20	Q In this case it was insufficient?
21	A In order to extend the regrsssion
22	analysis, yes.

is the fact that your 1 Q Now, regression, as it relates to your benchmark 2 market. involved only seven interactive 3 services. Correct? 4 include the if you 5 Α think, portable and non-portable. I'd have to check 6 7 how many there were. Well, if you include portable and 8 9 non-portable and don't double count, in other words, if it's the same entity, it's Napster 10 11 and Napster to Go portable, and Rhapsody and Rhapsody to Go portable, if you don't double 12 true 13 isn't it that the count those, 14 observations that you used for your 15 regression, that you testified about earlier, involved seven different services? 16 17 I don't call it double counting if Α 18 they are two different prices available in the 19 There are some prices here that from, market. 20 for example, Rhapsody Radio and Rhapsody Radio is provided by Rhapsody. So that is an 21 22 As I said, -observation.

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1	Q So if we don't let's get over
2	the semantics about double counting or not.
3	You'd have ten observations if you included
4	portable and non-portable. Right?
5	A Sounds about right, yes, but I'd
6	have to double check.
7	Q So somewhere between six and ten
8	we have enough observations to go from
9	something that's not reliable to something
10	that is?
11	A It depends on the data and how the
12	data varies, how easy it is to explain it, how
13	consistent it is across the data. If you have
14	six observations that are very tightly grouped
15	and consistent across the board in their
16	characteristics, it might be sufficient to
17	draw a conclusion. You can look at the data
18	and, in fact, I would say that behind any
19	attempt to dig deeper into a regression, let's
20	look at an obvious, what the data says to you.
21	The regression is a technique to
22	work with the data. The regression is

consistent with what I showed here. It
doesn't take a lot of very fine tuned analysis
to see that overall there is a ratio between
interactive and non-interactive in the market
in this general range that I've talked about,
about 55 percent, give or take. That's not
true with respect to the mobile internet radio
services where the characteristics are
different from the non-mobile services with
respect to channels and other features so it's
very hard to sort out. And that's what a
regression would need to do and why it would
need more data. It needs to sort out the
specific effect of mobility on the price.
And that's the goal of the
regression and that's what I said by not
having enough data.
Q Let's talk about the data you did
have, okay?
A Yes.
Q The box on page 60.
A Yes.

1	Q Now, Mobzilla?
2	A Yes.
3	Q Do you know what Mobzilla is?
4	A I do. I tried it out. It's a
5	I got it on my sign up and I think I did it as
6	a trial, I don't think I shelled out the
7	money. And you get to listen to whatever
8	channel, I think it was whatever channel you
9	preselected when you signed up and you listen
10	to it on your cell phone. I'm not sure how
11	you switch channels, but I'm aware, generally,
12	what it is.
13	Q Well, who does the consumer pay,
14	the phone company?
15	A They pay Mobzilla.
16	Q What is Mobzilla? Is it a
17	communications company or is it a webcaster?
18	A I don't know. It's available in
19	the market.
20	Q You don't know whether it's a
21	phone company or a webcaster?
22	A I don't know. I don't know who is

1	Mobzilla other than it is available in the
2	market, if you go to the market and try to buy
3	the service. And I did not buy this through
4	my phone company. So, whether they are owned
5	or partly owned by a phone company, it doesn't
6	matter to me. They are something that I, as
7	a subscriber to Verizon Wireless can get by
8	signing up online and paying my \$4.
9	Q And you say the number of stations
10	is 30. Does that mean you can get 30 stations
11	delivered to your phone or do you choose or
12	
13	A You can choose which of the 30 you
14	want to listen to. I don't recall how it sets
15	up, being able to switch channels, whether you
16	can do that. I think you can do that from
17	your phone. I don't recall exactly how its'
18	done.
19	Q Now, MusicChoice,
20	A Uh-huh.
21	Q that's the same service that
22	delivers digital music to homes. Correct?

1	A I don't recall.
2	Q Do you know how the price point
3	here of \$5.95 relates to what consumers pay if
4	they pay on an a la carte basis for the
5	MusicChoice service delivered to the home?
6	A No, I don't.
7	Q Skip down to Sirius Sprint.
8	That's the satellite service, is it not, that
9	operates under the SDARS statutory license?
10	A That is, it's the Sirius part of
11	it, but it's marketed through Sprint, I
12	believe. Q Well it's true, is it
13	not, that the channels being delivered there
14	are the same channels available on satellite
15	radio through Sprint, but available here on
16	the webcast market. Right?
17	A It's the same programming for 20
18	channels. You get 20 of the channels.
19	Obviously, not all of them.
20	Q Now, The satellite services are
21	delivered to a stationery, they're
22	delivered to a device that you can only listen

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1	to in your car. Correct? Under the statutory
2	license?
3	A I know that Sirius and XM, the two
4	satellite providers, are now selling or
5	providing service through other radios. They
6	don't have to be in your car.
7	Q Well, you've read about the
8	challenge by the recording industry to those
9	devices, have you not?
10	A I have not.
11	Q You're aware that the recording
12	industry is seeking to have legislation passed
13	that makes sure that the Satellite companies
14	can't take the or sell devices that would
15	enable consumers to capture the streams and
16	then play them back?
17	A First of all, that isn't what I
18	was talking about. You said, do you have to
19	listen to it in your car? You can get a
20	Sirius radio and carry it around with you or
21	put it by your beside. I was just commenting
22	on what's available in the market. I'm not

1	basing or saying anything about what anyone is
2	claiming before Congress or anyplace else.
3	Q Now, you would agree, however,
4	with the proposition that satellite radio, as
5	delivered through XM and Sirius, is not as
6	portable as delivering music by cell phones.
7	Right?
8	A I would say, presently, that's
9	probably the case, given the devices we have
10	now and given not just portability, but just
11	the ubiquity of, at present, of cell phones,
12	rather than satellite receivers.
13	Q And certainly prior to today, and
14	in the years 2003, 4 and 5, the XM and Sirius
15	services have not been available on as
16	portable a basis as cell phones provide.
17	Correct?
18	A Well, portable meaning are they
19	small, can you carry them everywhere, correct.
20	In terms of being available in your car, they
21	are, I would say, easier to use, in some
	1

sense, in that sense, more portable than

1	trying to hook up a cell phone to your car's
2	audio system.
3	Q Well
4	A I mean, I've tried to listen
5	I've listened to XM in my car and I've tried
6	to listen to things from my cell phone in my
7	car, and it's a lot easier to listen to XM.
8	Q In your car?
9	A In my car.
10	Q But when you're not in your car,
11	it's a lot easier to listen, that's the whole
12	point of your discussion about mobile service
13	premiums is that you can listen to music
14	anywhere. Right?
15	A Anywhere yes, virtually
16	anywhere. It depends on how good your cell
17	phone reception is.
18	Q Certainly not in my hotel.
19	Now, what I'm trying to understand
20	here is, you say that the data reflects that,
21	and this is on page 60, the new mobile
22	services appear to command a premium in the

1	marketplace. Right?
2	A Yes.
3	Q Now, the Sirius service, when it's
4	purchased for the car, costs twice that
5	amount, doesn't it?
6	A That's about right, yes.
7	Q So, where we have a situation
8	where when I'm purchasing my subscription to
9	Sirius which, up until now has been limited
10	utility in the car, subject to your testimony,
11	I pay \$12 a month, but now, now that I can
12	have it on my mobile phone, I'm going to pay
13	half as much. Not twice as much, half as
14	much. Right?
15	A If you want to just look at price
16	without looking at that other column there,
17	number of channels, 20. So, you can do any
18	calculation you want.
19	You can say on a per channel
20	basis, you're paying a lot more for Sirius on
21	a Sprint phone than you are for Sirius in your
22	car

1	Q And have you done any study of how
2	many different channels people tend to listen
3	to when they subscribe to Sirius?
4	A How many they listen to and not
5	how many are available? No.
6	Q Okay. And did you consider, in
7	your testimony that talked about how mobile
8	services typically command a premium, that
9	with respect to one of the services on your
10	chart, in fact the price for the mobile
11	service is half as much of the price of the
12	offline service, if you will, off-mobile
13	service?
14	A You're just asking with respect to
15	Sirius, to be specific?
16	Q That's one of the six observations
17	you have here, yes.
18	A And I would repeat my answer,
19	which is, it's not the same service if you're
20	getting 20 channels rather than over 100
21	channels.
22	Q Now, with respect to MSpot Radio

1	and MSpot Music Radio, what are those
2	services? What is the difference between the
3	two?
4	A At this point, I don't recall.
5	Q Are they owned by different
6	companies?
7	A As I said, I don't recall.
8	Q Do you they operate statutory
9	license webcasting services or different kinds
10	of webcasting services?
11	A I don't recall.
12	Q What about Mobzilla? Do you know
13	whether they are operating services under the
14	statutory license or not?
15	A I don't know but the nature of the
16	service, as I have used it, is similar to a
17	statutory land line service in the sense of
18	being a stream of preprogrammed music.
19	Q You haven't analyzed whether it's
20	within or not the sound recording performance
21	compliment?
22	A No. I've looked at this from the

1	consumer standpoint.
2	Q Is MSpot Radio sold by a company
3	that is a programmer of webcasting under the
4	statutory license or a telephone company, a
5	mobile company?
6	A I don't recall.
7	Q Do you know whether any of the
8	prices include the price of delivery?
9	A What do you mean by that?
10	Q It wasn't a very good question.
11	I'll rephrase it.
12	Are you familiar with the fact
13	that mobile phone providers sell access to a
14	number of things, right? At this point?
15	A Yes.
16	Q They sell access to telephone
17	service. Correct?
18	A They provide telephone service.
19	Q Right. And they provide a series
20	of programming options that consumers can
21	choose to buy or not from the cell phone
22	company?

1	A I mean, I wouldn't put it that
2	way. They provide, you know, options of
3	different packages that the customer can get
4	which have a whole set of attributes.
5	Q Well, I'm trying to figure out
6	whether you know whether, in connection with
7	these services, what the relationship is
8	between the mobile company and the actual
9	provider of the content. In other words, does
10	to the consumer contract with the phone
11	company to obtain the delivery of the service
12	and then the phone company have a relationship
13	with the service itself?
14	A In some cases the customer does
15	business with the cell phone company and, in
16	other cases, this is provided independently.
17	Q Well, in which cases is it that
18	the consumer has the relationship with the
19	cell phone company?
20	A Sirius Sprint. I don't know about
21	the others. I do know that there has been,
22	you know, various, very changing deals offered

1	by Sprint. So, I don't know if any of the
2	other cell phone companies have been very
3	active at marketing music services.
4	Q Do you know whether any of the
5	companies operating under the statutory
6	license are making their webcasts available
7	through cell phone companies today?
8	A Well, the Rhapsody services, it's
9	the same company that's offering the customer
10	among its various services, the mobile
11	service.
12	Q Well, do you know whether the
13	Rhapsody service that's available on mobile
14	requires you to contract with the mobile
15	company from whom you get your cell phone
16	reception?
17	A I don't believe it does.
18	Q Do you know that one way or the
19	other?
20	A I'm not certain but I would, quite
21	frankly, I'd expect it's similar to Mobzilla,
22	that they could certainly, Rhapsody can set

	) in the second of the second
1	up a system that customers can connect to
2	without having to purchase or designate that
3	with their cell phone company. It's certainly
4	technology that's there. I've used it. It
5	works.
6	Q Do you know whether any of that
7	\$6.95 that you put down for Rhapsody goes to
8	the cell phone company that enables the
9	delivery to the consumer?
10	A Not that I know of.
11	Q You don't know one way or the
12	other?
13	A I'm not certain but if the service
14	can get that to the customer without the cell
15	phone companies active participation, they
16	don't have to give any to the cell phone
17	company.
18	Q And do you know whether it's
19	possible to get it to the cell phone user
20	without the active participation of the cell
21	phone company?
22	A They don't have to agree to it, as

1	long as they don't block it. It's a
2	broadband, it's a stream of bits and, if the
3	customer has the right equipment, it can be
4	put over the air and, as any sort of bits are
5	put over the air, and the customer can listen
6	to it. I mean, I've done it. I know it
7	works.
8	Q Now, let me ask you this question.
9	When a consumer buys a CD at a store, let's
10	call it \$16.95 for the sake of argument, you
11	pay just \$16.95 for the CD, if that's all
12	you're going to buy, and you walk out. Are
13	you with me so far, just in terms of
14	A Yes. We've lost our round
15	numbers.
16	Q Okay. Yes, well, we're not going
17	to do much math with his.
18	A Okay.
19	Q If you're home and you call the
20	store and you say, look, I really want the new
21	CD that came out, will you FedEx it to me and
22	the store says yes, then you would expect,

1	would you not, that the consumer would pay the
2	\$16.95 plus the cost of delivery. Right?
3	A If you want it overnight, yes.
4	Q Now, are you familiar with the
5	fact that there are a number of products being
6	sold by mobile companies where the consumer
7	pays an aggregated fee for the product plus
8	the cost of delivering right there on your
9	mobile phone?
10	A Yes, ringtones, V CAST type of
11	things, other types of content, yes.
12	Q If, in the situation where you
13	were buying something that has a market value
14	of X and then you're asking that it be
15	delivered in a particular way, have you heard,
16	in the economic literature, the reference to
17	that situation as being an aggregated price,
18	with some portion of it being for delivery?
19	A Not in that terminology but there
20	is certainly if you're trying to say that
21	something has a cost to be able to listen to
22	it in addition to what you have to pay from

or whoever let's say the store, providing it to you, that is the cost to the customer and the customer is incurring a cost. So, if a customer has to subscribe and pay more to his cell phone company and pay an extra \$4 to be able to have the right to get Mobzilla, then the customer is still paying \$4 And that's -- those are the to Mobzilla. I'm not showing the prices I'm showing you. final cost to the customer. I'm not including the cost here, I'm not including that in the cost of the equipment needed to play CDs or the computers needed to play webcasts.

Q And you don't know how much of this monthly price listed for the six observations that you've made, consists, if at all, of delivery charges. Right?

A In some cases, clearly none. In other cases some. But in all cases, it's what the customer pays and it's an indication that customers will pay a premium to have music streamed to their cell phones, compared to

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just being able to get it on their computers. 1 And is it your testimony that even 2 0 though the product may be identical and the 3 difference in cost to the consumer may be the 4 to the phone company 5 pavable cost delivering it in the fashion of a mobile 6 device, that the sound recording companies 7 should get an increased royalty merely because 8 9 there's a delivery component in the cost to 10 the consumer? 11 That's too long a question for me Α 12 to answer. I'm serious. I didn't comprehend 13 it. Well, in the hypothetical of a 14 Q 15 situation where it's the identical music being 16 delivered over the computer and over the cell 17 phone and to the customer, they pay a greater 18 fee of \$2 than they would otherwise pay for 19 example, --20 Pays \$2 more? Α 21 Right. Q 22 A Okay.

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Q If it subscribes to the service through the mobile company rather than just the internet service, would you attribute the entirety of that \$2, which enables you to get the service by mobile as well as by computer, to the revenue base against which a sound recording royalty would apply?

Not necessarily and I don't think Α it would matter whether there is a cost, a share of this paid to the cell phone company or there is a cost the customer incurs to get the service. I'm -- the share of revenue that think the copyright holders should get should reflect the value to the consumer and a higher price is indicative of a higher value to the consumer. Part of that might be because it's more expensive to get it to him. Part of it might be, you know, various other But I hope that answers it. reasons. struggling.

Q Let me ask you to move to page 57 of your report. Am I correct that in pages 57

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1	up to the top of 58 what you've done is
2	compare the ratio of prices charged by sound
3	recording companies for preprogrammed or non-
4	interactive music as compared to interactive
5	music?
6	A No. I both do that comparison and
7	I also present the share of revenue that is
8	received for both types of video, music
9	videos.
10	Q Well, let's focus on the ratio.
11	First of all, you've, in your testimony,
12	recommended that when we look at the relative
13	value of a benchmark market on-demand service
14	compared to a target market non-interactive
15	service, we should look at the difference
16	between what the consumer pays for the
17	benchmark market service as compared to what
18	the consumer pays for the non-interactive
19	service. Right?
20	A Right.
21	Q Now, you could look at it the
22	other way. Right? You could, if you wanted

1	to look at ratios of value, look at the
2	difference between what the seller charges for
3	interactive product compared to what the
4	seller charges for non-interactive product.
5	Right?
6	A I assume the consumer buys what
7	the seller sells. So, that's the market
8	price. I don't know I don't understand the
9	distinction that you're trying to draw.
10	Q Well you have focused, for the
11	model you want to put forward here, on what
12	consumers pay for two different kinds of
13	services, your benchmark market service, which
14	is interactive on-demand streaming, and your
15	non-interactive target market services.
16	Right?
17	A Yes.
18	Q Now, that doesn't tell us what the
19	sound recording companies value their
20	copyrights for in terms of the relative value
21	from their perspective, as they sell their

product. Does it?

permission of Neal R. Gross Co. 10
A It doesn't. And primarily, the
statutory rate is set in one case and the
other is based on a willing buyer and a
willing seller.
Q Well, let's focus on the willing
sellers because the consumer is not either the
willing buyer or the willing seller in the
willing buyer/willing seller analysis that the
panel has to set. Right?
A That's correct.
Q So, let's focus on the seller.
You would agree, would you not, that as you
discuss here on page 57, when the sound

You would agree, would you not, that as you discuss here on page 57, when the sound recording sellers sell licenses to music videos for streaming on the internet, they set rates that are differential, typically, from what they charge for on-demand interactive streaming as distinguished from preprogrammed non-interactive streaming. Right?

A On a per stream basis or a per play basis, yes. Not on the revenue percentage.

б

1	Q But on a per stream basis, the
2	ratio, I think, you point out, on page 57
3	carrying over to 58, is roughly five to one?
4	A Right.
5	Q So that the non-interactive stream
6	is something they charge on a per play basis,
7	one-fifth of the on-demand stream. Right?
8	A When that's what's actually paid
9	on the greater of contract, yes. That
10	characterizes that part of the rate structure.
11	Q And are you familiar with the fact
12	that,
13	MR. STEINTHAL: And I'm going to
14	ask this question and ask that the question
15	and answer be restricted, Your Honor, because
16	it reveals information provided by one of the
17	labels on a restricted basis. So, I'm just
18	assuming that if I were to ask the witness
19	whether he's aware of the particular price
20	point of a particular label, the gentlemen on
21	the other side would request that we have that

It's just one question and

restricted.

1	answer.
2	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Your motion
3	is not sufficiently specific to generate a
4	response.
5	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter
6	went off the record at 11:47 a.m. for a closed
7	session.)
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#### BY MR. STEINTHAL:

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anal;	ysis,	sir,	as :	betwee	en th	e ta	rget	mar	cet
and	the be	enchma	ark m	arket	serv	ices	, you	did	n't
cons	ider	the	fact	that	one	is	subj	ect	to
stat	utory	lice	nsing	and o	one i	s not	. C	orre	ct?

A In the sense of -- yes, that's underlying my analysis is the facts are what they are in the market. I did consider it because if it wasn't a statutory rate in one market and it was -- they were both willing buyer and willing seller, we wouldn't have to be here.

O Okay. That's а fair answer. Putting that aside, that we wouldn't have to otherwise be here, did you take into consideration Congressional any associated with services operating under the statutory license?

A If you mean legislative history, no.

Q So you didn't consider any factors

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	that may underlie why the statutory license
2	exists in the first place? Any legislative
3	history factors, to be clear?
4	A I did not.
5	Q Would it affect your analysis at
6	all if you were aware that labels in
7	establishing the prices in your benchmark
8	market in part did so with an intent to
9	establish good precedent for statutory rate
10	setting?
11	MR. HANDZO: Objection. I think
12	this was asked and answered yesterday.
13	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Mr.
14	Steinthal?
15	MR. STEINTHAL: I'm pretty
16	confident I didn't ask that question.
17	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: You're asking
18	him to conjecture on the opinion of someone
19	that entered into a contract?
20	MR. STEINTHAL: I'm asking him
21	whether it would affect his analysis if he had
22	evidence that labels, in establishing prices

1	in the benchmark market, did so in part to
2	establish precedent for statutory rate
3	setting?
4	MR. HANDZO: In addition to the
5	Court's concerns, I'm fairly confident that he
6	did ask that question because I can tell you
7	what the answer is. He can get it again from
8	the witness, but he's already answered it.
9	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Objection
10	overruled.
11	THE WITNESS: I frankly don't
12	remember what I said before. So, I would have
13	to say, would it affect my analysis? I
14	basically say I can't answer that in the
15	abstract. I think there's far too much market
16	evidence for me to think that this is being
17	driven by intent to affect the statutory rate.
18	BY MR. STEINTHAL:
19	Q Now you're aware, are you not,
20	that in 2003, two years before you undertook
21	to conduct the analysis underlying your model,
22	that SoundExchange and its label members

voluntarily agreed to rates for statutory 1 license webcasts under a different framework, 2 3 correct, a licensee option? There wasn't added option Right. 4 Α to the 0.007 cent per play. 5 But you're aware that two years 6 7 before you did your model, there was voluntary agreement between SoundExchange and 8 the webcasters that established rates, at the 9 licensee's option for subscription services of 10 11 10.9 cents -- sorry, 10.9 percent with a 27 12 cent per sub minimum or a per usage rate 13 either based on a 0.0007 cents per play or 14 1.17 cents per hour? 15 I am aware of that. 2003 16 0 Now, as of when that 17 agreement was entered into, the interactive services in your benchmark market already had 18 19 an established rate structure of the greater

NEAL R. GROSS

of, essentially, 50 percent of revenue, a

penny a play, or somewhere between \$2.50 and

\$3 per sub, isn't that right?

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1	A Yes.
2	Q If you recall in reference to your
3	testimony about table 6.2, you said that you
4	wanted to have a sanity check on your
5	regression, right? And that's partially what
6	6.2 was?
7	A Yes.
8	Q Did you do any sanity check of
9	your model's results against what the
10	recording industry voluntarily agreed two
11	years beforehand?
12	A That would be an insanity check.
13	I mean, to apply a carry forward of a rate
14	from a previous CARP decision rather than
15	reenter into another litigated situation is
16	not a market. So, that would not be sane.
17	Q As an economist you don't presume
18	that actors enter into deals that they don't
19	believe are acceptable for them under the
20	circumstances in the market at the time
21	they're negotiating. Correct?
22	A Under the circumstances, the

1	market including all of the institutional,
2	legal and other factors that are present
3	affecting what they believed they would get if
4	they didn't complete the negotiation.
5	Q And that's true as to both sides
6	to a negotiation, in your view. Right?
7	A Yes.
8	Q And I gather then that because you
9	felt that it was an insanity check, you didn't
10	seek to conduct any analysis of why it was
11	that your model came out to the results that
12	it came out to so disproportionately to the
13	voluntary agreement that was entered into by
14	SoundExchange in 2003?
15	A I've already said, I think, that
16	whether it's the original CARP rate or the
17	carry forward that was agreed to, that that
18	was not a market determined rate because it
19	was either set by the CARP or carried forward
20	to avoid another hearing right away.
21	Q Now, on page 29 to 30 of your
22	written statement and also on your direct

testimony, you pointed out that if you take in isolation just one of the three elements of a greater of formula, either the per sub, the per play, or the percentage, you, in essence, undervalue that element. Correct?

if don't know Ι used the undervalued but I said it would not take account of the tradeoffs that went into the greater of formulation and would lead to a would otherwise be than lower rate appropriate.

Q If you turned it around, flipped it over, and you were looking at a lesser of or licensee option framework, the same would be true, would it not, in the sense that if you were looking at a lesser of formula and you had a choice of choosing to play on a per play, per hour, or percentage of revenue rate, then looking at any one of those elements on their own, would effectively overestimate the actual amount agreed to. Correct?

A If you were to adopt that.

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1	Looking at it and adopting it are two
2	different things. But if you were to take a
3	three part lesser of structure and just get
4	rid of two of the three options, it would do
5	that.
6	MR. STEINTHAL: I have no further
7	questions, Your Honor.
8	Oh, one minor thing, Your Honor.
9	I wanted to move into evidence one of the
10	schedules from the witness, which I think
11	would be helpful to the panel as well. I'm
12	going to mark as Services Exhibit 63,
14	going to main as solvitoes minimate out
13	Attachment A to the witnesses report.
13	Attachment A to the witnesses report.
13 14	Attachment A to the witnesses report.  (Whereupon, the above-
13 14 15	Attachment A to the witnesses report.  (Whereupon, the above- referred to document
13 14 15 16	Attachment A to the witnesses report.  (Whereupon, the above- referred to document referred to as Services
13 14 15 16 17	Attachment A to the witnesses report.  (Whereupon, the above- referred to document referred to as Services Exhibit No. 63 was
13 14 15 16 17 18	Attachment A to the witnesses report.  (Whereupon, the above- referred to document referred to as Services Exhibit No. 63 was marked for
13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Attachment A to the witnesses report.  (Whereupon, the above- referred to document referred to as Services Exhibit No. 63 was m a r k e d f o r identification.)

1	MR. STEINTHAL: It's not in the
2	actual, the direct statement, but it's
3	referred to. If it was in, we wouldn't be
4	doing this. It was produced in discovery.
5	Let me just ask the witness.
6	BY MR. STEINTHAL:
7	Q Is this schedule a schedule of 17
8	agreements and the details about the 17
9	agreements which you testified about
10	underlying the benchmark market?
11	A Let me check. Yes.
12	MR. STEINTHAL: I'd offer Exhibit
13	63 into evidence.
14	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Any objection
15	to Exhibit 63?
16	MR. HANDZO: No, Your Honor. I
17	would note, however, that it was produced
18	subject to the protective order and,
19	therefore, ask that it be designated as
20	restricted in this record.
21	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: There being
22	no objection, the exhibit is admitted.

1	(Whereupon, the document
2	marked as Services
3	Exhibit No. 63 for
4	identification was
5	received into evidence.)
6	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Any objection
7	to submitting the exhibit to the provisions of
8	the protective order?
9	(No response.)
10	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: With no
11	objection, the motion to submit to the
12	provisions of the protective order is granted.
13	Mr. Steinthal, you are now
14	concluded?
15	MR. STEINTHAL: Yes. Thank you,
16	Your Honor.
17	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Mr. Joseph,
18	do you wish to begin your cross-examination
19	for a half an hour?
20	MR. JOSEPH: I do, Your Honor.
21	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: All right.
22	MR. JOSEPH: Although I would

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	appreciate about three minutes to do the
2	transfer of places.
3	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Go right
4	ahead.
5	MR. JOSEPH: Thank you.
6	THE WITNESS: Could I use that
7	three minutes to run to the mens' room, Your
8	Honor?
9	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Certainly.
10	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
11	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: We'll recess
12	for five minutes.
13	THE WITNESS: Okay. Wonderful. I
14	appreciate it.
15	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter
16	went off the record at 12:02 p.m. and went
17	back on the record at 12:06 p.m.)
18	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: We will come
19	to order. Mr. Joseph?
20	MR. JOSEPH: Thank you, Your
21	Honor.
22	BY MR. JOSEPH

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	Q Good afternoon, Mr. Pelcovits. We
2	met, of course, at your deposition. Right?
3	A Good afternoon or yes, it
4	is. Good afternoon, Mr. Joseph.
5	Q I was waiting to see whether I was
6	going to get to say good afternoon or good
7	morning. But we crossed that.
8	Just to start, to make sure that
9	we're speaking the same language, Dr.
10	Pelcovits, your written testimony uses a
11	couple of terms that we didn't hear yesterday
12	and today. And I just want to make sure we
13	understand them.
14	I believe one of the terms is
15	interactive DAT and NI-DAT. Correct?
16	A Yes.
17	Q Okay. And by interactive DAT, in
18	your written testimony, and I think at times
19	in your deposition when we were talking back
20	in early March, you mean interactive digital
21	audio transmission services. Correct?
22	A Correct.

1	Q And yesterday in your oral
2	testimony and, I think, at times today, you
3	referred to the market for these sound
4	recording performance license for those
5	services as your benchmark market. Correct?
6	A Yes.
7	Q And by NI-DAT, you meant the non-
8	interactive webcasters covered by the
9	statutory license. Correct?
10	A Correct.
11	Q And you referred to the market for
12	sound recording performance licenses for NI-
13	DAT services as your target market. Correct?
14	A Correct.
15	Q Okay. Now, with respect to each
16	type of service, would it be accurate to say
17	that there are at least two markets? On the
18	one hand, the market for the sound recording
19	performance license, which is a market where
20	the seller is the licensor or the record
21	companies and the buyers are the services and

a market for the services to consumers where

1	the sellers are the services and the buyers
2	are consumers?
3	A Yes.
4	Q Now, a little earlier today when
5	you were talking to Mr. Steinthal and said
6	that you used a competitive market model for
7	the purpose of estimating the rate, you were
8	referring there, I believe, you also testified
9	to your model, assuming that the consumer
10	market for the webcasting services was
11	competitive, not necessarily that the
12	benchmark market for the sound recording
13	licenses was competitive. Correct?
14	A That's what I was referring to,
15	yes.
16	Q Now, in fact in your analysis you
17	didn't make any assumptions about the
18	competitive status of your benchmark market.
19	You just took that market as it is. Correct?
20	A It's fair to say I took the market
21	as it is and I think I said in my testimony,
22	I believe, that there's no monopoly power in

that market, in the market, in the record industry as a whole. That it's a workably competitive market.

Q And you base that, if I understood your testimony, on the prior CARP decision and then on a review of changes in that market as a result of the Sony-BMG merger and the review of that merger by the Federal Trade Commission and the European Commission. Correct?

A I based the adoption of using the sellers as they are now based on the previous CARP decision. It's straight forward application except with respect to the change in the industry from B5 to B4.

I based my statement on the market being generally workably competitive, is the term I think I used in my deposition to refer to the record industry as a whole on the findings of the Federal Trade Commission that approved the BMG-Sony joint venture, subject to the anti-trust laws.

Q Now, if you please turn to page 10

of your written statement where there's a paragraph that I believe was referred to yesterday, or a sentence at the end of the first paragraph, where you say the willingness of a seller to offer a service at a particular price is, in large measure, a function of its cost, the effect of sales of one service on sales of other services sold by the same company, and the intensity of competition in the marketplace, both in the large and the short run.

It's true, is it not, that you didn't analyze your benchmark market to determine the intensity of competition in that market. Correct?

A Other than to refer to the federal government's review of the market as a whole, I did not.

Q Now, just to be clear with respect to your reliance on the prior CARP decision, do you understand the CARP in 2001 to have analyzed the licensed, the market for sound

1	recording licenses for interactive digital
2	audio transmission services to determine
3	whether it was competitive?
4	A I believe they adopted it and
5	accepted the competition in the market, as it
6	stood at that point. Exactly how they
7	referred to it, the term competitive, or
8	whatever, I don't recall.
9	Q Now, when you say they adopted it
10	and referred to the market, I'm referring here
11	specifically to the market for sound recording
12	licenses for interactive digital audio
13	transmission services. Did you understand the
14	CARP to have analyzed whether or not that
15	market was competitive?
16	A I don't recall that I made a
17	specific analysis of the term, whether it's
18	competitive or not. I'd have to go back and
19	look.
20	Q Do you recall whether they
21	analyzed that particular market at all?
22	A Well, they used that market for

1	the basis of determine what a willing seller
2	was. And they said that the willing sellers
3	were the record companies.
4	Q So it's your understanding that
5	the CARP used the market for the sale of sound
6	recording licenses to interactive digital
7	audio transmissions services as the basis for
8	its decision?
9	A I don't know if you can say they
10	used the market. They used the sellers in the
11	market and they treated those as the willing
12	sellers.
13	Q But did they analyze that market
14	specifically?
15	A I don't recall.
16	Q Well, do you recall your
17	discussion with Mr. Steinthal earlier this
18	morning where it was represented that that
19	market barely had started by 2002?
20	A Yes.
21	Q So, at the time that the CARP was
22	deciding, there wouldn't have been very much

to analyze with respect to that particular market, would there have been?

Well, you're looking at a market. It's one of the many markets in which sound recordings are provided. And I would say you can't, in terms of any market competition analysis, just say let's look at one piece of the market without looking at the entire behavior and actions of the record companies as an industry in and of itself. It's an industry that sells in multiple channels. would not look at the sale in a particular channel analysis of workable as an competition.

Q So, it's your testimony that when anti-trust authorities review mergers, they don't look at each of the markets in which the sellers participate?

A They might. They might not. It depends on the nature of those markets, the firms in the market, and how they go about analyzing it.

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1	Q Well, do you understand the prior
2	CARP to have actually analyzed whether any
3	market for the licensing of sound recording
4	performance rights was competitive?
5	A I know they used the working
6	I'm sorry. They used existing record
7	companies as the willing sellers. Exactly how
8	thy referred to competition and what
9	specifically they said about the nature of the
10	competition in the market, I don't recall. I
11	do recall they looked at the issue of how does
12	a market function and they adopted, as I said,
13	willing sellers as the record companies. They
14	chose that as the market to look at.
15	Q But I'm not sure I don't
16	believe that answered my question. My
17	question was, do you know whether the prior
18	CARP actually analyzed whether any market for
19	the licensing of sound recording performance
20	rights was competitive?
21	A I don't know what they analyzed.
22	I know there's some statements about

competition in the market. I don't recall the 1 specific wording or contents. 2 And do you have any understanding 3 0 of what evidence, if any, was presented to the 4 CARP on the question of whether and to what 5 6 extent the record companies competed with each other for the licensing of sound recording 7 performance rights? 8 9 I don't believe it. I believe Α 10 they looked and compared the option of -- they compared the option of either looking at the 11 12 copyright holder having the copyright 13 multiple parties having the same copyright 14 And they said the purpose of using 15 this standard was to look at the actual 16 copyright holder having that right. 17 Sir, once again, I don't -- maybe 18 my question wasn't clear. Let me try it 19 But I don't think you answered it. again. 20 I asked whether you had any 21 understanding of what evidence, if any, was

presented to the CARP on the question of

	whether and to what extent the record
	companies competed with each other for the
	licensing of sound recording performance
	rights? And do you have any understanding of
	what evidence, if any, was presented to the
	CARP on the question of whether and to what
	extent the record companies compete with each
	other as sellers in any market? What
	evidence?
	A Right. I do not know what
	evidence was presented to them.
	Q And I take it you would agree that
ĺ	the CARP did not evaluate whether any
	particular agreements negotiated by the
	existing record companies were negotiated in
	a competitive market, but instead relied on an
	agreement between the RIAA collective and
	Yahoo as its primary benchmark. Correct?
	A That was the benchmark they relied
	on. I'll agree with that.
	Q Would you do you know whether
	they evaluated whether any particular markets

negotiated by the record companies were
negotiated in a competitive market?
A I do not recall.
Q Wold you agree that the market for
the sale of physical CDs is a different market
than your benchmark market, the market for the
sound recording performance right for
interactive digital services?
A Can we be precise on terminology?
Do you mean the sale of CDs by the record
companies to the retail outlets or the
retailing of CDs overall?
Q Sale of CDs to the retail outlets
to the record companies.
A And the question is, do I regard -
- is that a different market from the market
for the sale of or the provision of
performance rights to the webcasting services?
Q Well, to the interactive digital
services, your benchmark market.
A Right. Do I think it's a
different market? It is a different market

with very similar characteristics. With very 1 similar characteristics. 2 3 Q Now, I believe yesterday, at one point in your testimony, I think it was on 4 direct, you said that the "market has been 5 6 found to be competitive." Can you tell me, 7 first of all, what market you were referring to when you said that? 8 9 was referring to the record Ι industry as a whole and looking at whether the 10 industry is workably competitive, I think, is 11 12 generally the term I prefer to use because we 13 don't almost ever see a perfect textbook 14 competition. But, that's what I was referring 15 to. 16 again, by found to be Q And 17 competitive, you were referring to the fact that the FTC decided not to challenge the 18 19 Sony-BMG merger? 20 Α That's what I'm referring to, yes. 21 By the way, in considering that Q 22 issue, did you also take into account and

1	review the European Commission decision with
2	respect to the Sony-BMG merger?
3	A I did.
4	Q And are you relying on that for
5	your conclusion about the finding to be
6	competitive as well?
7	A I'm relying on both of those
8	decisions to support a general statement that
9	the record industry is workably competitive,
10	not to try to analyze any specific market in
11	which they participate.
12	Q Now, considering the Sony-BMG
13	merger to which you have referred, is it your
14	understanding that the Federal Trade
15	Commission would have applied the FTC and
16	Department of Justice merger guidelines in its
17	analysis?
18	A Yes.
19	Q Did you review the merger
20	guidelines?
21	A I have many times, yes.
22	Q And one of the things that the FTC
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1	would have looked at when it was evaluating
2	the merger was the concentration of the sound
3	recording industry. Correct?
4	A Yes.
5	Q And, if anything, the Sony-BMG
6	merger made the sound recording industry more
7	concentrated than it previously was. Correct?
8	A Yes.
9	Q Now, it's true, is it not, that
10	the primary measure of concentration used by
11	the Justice Department and by the Federal
12	Trade Commission when it evaluates mergers is
13	something called the Herfindahl-Hirschman
14	index. Correct?
15	A Yes.
16	Q And can you explain how the
17	Herfindahl-Hirschman index for an industry is
18	calculated?
19	A Yes. It's calculated by taking
20	the market shares of the participants and
21	taking the square of those market shares and
22	then summing it up.

1	Q So, if you have one participant in
2	a market, the HHI would be 10,000, which is
3	100 squared. Right?
4	A Correct.
5	Q Now, if you have an atomistic
6	market where each company has a small
7	fractional share of the market, the HHI
8	actually approaches zero. Right?
9	A That's mathematically right, yes.
10	Q So, that's your range. You go
11	from zero to 10,000. Right?
12	A Close to zero to 10,000, yes.
13	Q Approaching zero. Would it be
14	correct to say epsilon to 10,000?
15	A Epsilon, I like that. Yes.
16	Q Now, just to give the panel a
17	sense of how the HHI scale works, if you have
18	two companies in a market and each had a 50
19	percent market share, the HHI would be 5,000.
20	Right?
21	A Right.
22	Q That would be 50 times 50, which

1	is 2,500, twice. You have to double it.
2	Right?
3	A Correct.
4	Q Because there's two firms?
5	A Yes.
6	Q And if you had four companies,
7	each with a 25 percent market share, the HHI
8	would be 2,500. Right? 25 squared is 1,250,
9	I believe.
10	A Good, I'm glad you're doing the
11	math for me.
12	Q Well, I'm going to ask you to do
13	some math in a second, so
14	A Oh, okay. Well, I didn't bring my
15	calculator but I'm ready.
16	Q But would you agree that at four
17	firms
18	A Four firms, 25 times 25 times 4.
19	So, 2,500.
20	Q Okay. And you would agree, would
21	you not that both the DOJ, or the DOJ and the
22	FTC, in the merger guidelines, divide the

spectrum of market concentration as measured
by the HHI into three regions that they
broadly characterize as unconcentrated,
moderately concentrated, and highly
concentrated. Correct?
A That sounds right. I don't
remember the exact terminology. I'll take
your word for it.
Q And it sets the ranges for those -
- well, rather than play guessing games, why
don't we pass out the merger guidelines so
that you can look at it.
MR. HANDZO: If I can just
interpose an objection to try and move this
along? Some amount of cross-examination on
his assumptions is certainly fair but I would
submit that we are well beyond the scope of
direct at this point.
CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Mr. Joseph?
MR. JOSEPH: Your Honor, the
fundamental conclusion was that, of his direct
testimony and on which his entire presentation

has to be based, is that the underlying market that he uses as a benchmark, is workably competitive or is a competitive marketplace. Especially given the statutory standard in this case, which is that the -- your job is to find the price that would -- most willing buyers would pay willing sellers in a competitive market.

And he has testified that he believed, on direct, that it was workably competitive and that it was found to be so by these anti-trust authorities.

fundamental seems to me It. cross-examination to probe the basis for that conclusion, the basis for that understanding, what he relied upon, and indeed whether or not his reliance on the idea that his benchmark market is a workably competitive competitive market that would be one that you should give any credit to for the purpose of deciding what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller is fundamental to my cross-

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examination. 1 CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Why aren't 2 those legal arguments? 3 They are in part --MR. JOSEPH: 4 there's some legal argument but there's a lot 5 of foundation, including what this witness 6 7 relied on in reaching his conclusion with respect to that marketplace. 8 Ι could 9 MR. HANDZO: Ιf just respond, Your Honor? I think his fundamental 10 conclusion was that the CARP, last time, said 11 12 the willing sellers are the record companies 13 and that's what he used as his willing Beyond that, I think we're getting 14 sellers. 15 into the underpinnings of the original CARP 16 decision which I think is water long under the bridge and I just don't see how, with all the 17 18 other issues we have to deal with, how we can try an anti-trust case in the middle of this 19 20 case. May I, Your Honor? 21 MR. JOSEPH: 22 actually getting into the We're not

underpinnings of the prior decision. He said,
the witness has testified, that he relied on
these merger approvals for the competitive
nature of his benchmark and that he didn't
rely he relied on the underlying CARP to
define the market, but the question of whether
or not that market is competitive and whether
he was reasonable in relying on it, goes to
the nature of his analysis, the validity of
his analysis.
CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: All right.
The objection is overruled.
BY MR. JOSEPH:
Q Dr. Pelcovits, I've just handed
you a document marked as Services Exhibit 64.
Have you seen that document before?
A I have.
Q And that is the Justice
Department, FTC merger guidelines. Correct?
Department, Fit merger garderines. Correct:
A It is.

1 Exhibit No. 64 was marked
2 for identification.)
BY MR. JOSEPH:
Q I would ask you, please to since
we were talking about ranges, I would ask you
6 please to turn to page 15 of the guidelines,
7 where the ranges of unconcentrated, moderately
8 concentrated and highly concentrated are set
9 out. Correct?
10 A Yes.
Q Okay. And it's correct, is it
not, that the guidelines identify an
unconcentrated market as below 1,000,
moderately concentrated between 1,000 and
1,800 and highly concentrated as an HHI above
16 1,800. Correct?
17 A Yes.
Q Now, do you know what the sound
recording industry's HHI is after the Sony-BMG
merger? Have you calculated it?
A I haven't. It's in the range of
I don't know. I'd say it's close, it's in

the range of 2,000 or so. It might be a little lower, it might be a little higher. If you had five firms each with 20 percent market share, you'd get that number. So, here you have some firms a little bigger and you have many other firms, though I haven't calculated the exact number.

Q Let me hand you a document that may facilitate the math. Give one to opposing counsel, okay? Now, I'm handing out -- I'm sorry --

I've handed out a document that was produced under the protective order by Universal, one of the major labels and we'll whether, let see whether the me see examination is one that we can do without requiring any motion for restriction. would turn to -- and these are excerpts from a PowerPoint presentation that we will have described in greater detail when Mr. Kenswil takes the stand, Your Honor.

(Whereupon, the document

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1	referred to as Services
2	Exhibit No. 65 was marked
3	for identification.)
4	BY MR. JOSEPH:
5	Q But if you turn to the page that's
6	marked SX76616, there is a graph there, Dr.
7	Pelcovits, marked U.S. Nielsen SoundScan total
8	out in market share first half of 2005 and it
9	gives market shares for each of the four major
10	labels. Just for the purpose of getting a
11	rough number, I'd ask you to assume that those
12	market shares are accurate and ask you whether
13	it's not correct that the HHI for the
14	recording industry, based on those market
15	shares, is approximately 2,200? You can do
16	the math or
17	A I can do the math or say, yes. Or
18	we could
19	Q Well, I'm sorry.
20	A It's going to be in that range. I
21	can see that simply from the first two
22	calculations, yet.

1	Q So, about 2,200, you agree?
2	A That makes sense to me.
3	MR. JOSEPH: Your Honor, I can see
4	now we've approached 12:30. I'm going to
5	start on an additional line in this same area,
6	but it will take some time. So, I'm, you
7	know, I would suggest that this is a good time
8	to break, if that's what Your Honor would
9	like.
10	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: But you're
11	going to continue on this line of questioning
12	about what the about the analysis of
13	mergers
14	MR. JOSEPH: I'm going to
15	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: in the
16	Justice Department?
17	MR. JOSEPH: And the Federal Trade
18	Commission and what they looked at. Yes, Your
19	Honor.
20	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: All right.
21	We'll recess until 2:00.
22	(Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m., the above-
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1	entitled matter recessed to reconvene at 2:03
2	p.m. the same day.)
3	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Thank you.
4	We'll come to order.
5	MR. HANDZO: Before we begin,
6	SoundExchange has filed its opposition to the
7	motion to strike Ms. Fink's testimony. I have
8	courtesy copies here, they've already been
9	distributed in the courtroom. If the Court
10	would like copies, I can give them to you now.
11	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Please.
12	Mr. Joseph?
13	MR. JOSEPH: Thank you, Your
14	Honor.
15	In an effort to expedite the
16	discussion of the merger approvals, what I'm
17	going to do is actually hand out, let me count
18	the number of documents, six documents that
19	have been marked and try to get a sense or an
	<u> </u>
20	understanding from the witness of what the
20	understanding from the witness of what the witness saw and relied on and what he didn't.

1	BY MR. JOSEPH:
2	Q Okay now, Dr. Pelcovits, I have
3	handed you Services Exhibits 66, 67, 68, 69,
4	51, because that had already been shown to a
5	witness earlier in the case, and 70. I ask
6	you let's do them one at a time.
7	In reviewing the FTC and European
8	Commission approvals of the Sony-BMG merger,
9	did you review the document marked Services
10	Exhibit 66?
11	A I did.
12	(Whereupon, the document
13	referred to as Services
14	Exhibit No. 66 was marked
15	for identification.)
16	BY MR. JOSEPH:
17	Q Okay. Did you review the document
18	marked Services Exhibit 67?
19	A Yes.
20	(Whereupon, the document
21	referred to as Services
22	Exhibit No. 67 was marked

1	for identification.)
2	BY MR. JOSEPH:
3	Q Did you review the document marked
4	68?
5	A I don't recall reviewing each
6	letter, but it's the same letter. So, I
7	remember reviewing the letter.
8	(Whereupon, the document
9	referred to as Services
10	Exhibit No. 68 was marked
11	for identification.)
12	BY MR. JOSEPH:
13	Q Did you review the document marked
14	Services Exhibit 69?
15	A Yes.
16	(Whereupon, the document
17	referred to as Services
18	Exhibit No. 69 was marked
19	for identification.)
20	BY MR. JOSEPH:
21	Q Okay. Were these the FTC
22	documents you were referring to when you said

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	you reviewed the FTC discussion of the Sony-
2	BMG merger and that you relied on in reaching,
3	in part, in reaching your conclusion?
4	A I relied on these as evidence that
5	the FTC did not block the merger and I
6	inferred, based on my knowledge of merger
7	practice and approval practice that, as I said
8	in my testimony, that the industry and the
9	firms don't have a monopoly power.
10	MR. JOSEPH: I would offer
11	documents, Services Exhibits 66, 67, 68, and
12	69 on that basis.
13	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Any
14	objections to 66, 67, 68, and 69?
15	MR. HANDZO: No, Your Honor.
16	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: No objection.
17	Each of these exhibits is admitted.
18	(Whereupon, the documents
19	marked as Services
20	Exhibits No. 66 through
21	69 for identification
22	were received
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1	into evidence.)
2	BY MR. JOSEPH:
3	Q Now I ask you, Dr. Pelcovits, to
4	take a look at Exhibit 51, which purports to
5	be the European Commission Order or Discussion
6	Decision in the merger case. Did you
7	review this document, and is that part of what
8	you relied upon?
9	A Yes.
10	MR. JOSEPH: I would offer Exhibit
11	51.
12	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Any
13	objections to Exhibit 51?
14	MR. HANDZO: No.
15	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Without
16	objection, Exhibit 51 is admitted.
17	(Whereupon, the document
18	marked as Services
19	Exhibit No. 51 for
20	identification was
20	identification was received into evidence.)

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

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1	Q And I would ask you to look at
2	Services Exhibit 70, Dr. Pelcovits. This
3	appears to be an article by a Susan Manning
4	and Helen Eileen Reed that, among other
5	things, on page 8669 discusses the merger and
6	it was identified in an inter excuse me.
7	Withdraw that.
8	This purports to be an article by
9	Ms. Reed and Manning that on page 8669
10	discusses the Sony-BMG merger and it was
11	identified in an interrogatory response as a
12	document that you reviewed in connection with
13	the merger by SoundExchange. Have you seen
14	this article?
15	A I have. I think it actually
16	starts on 8668 and continues to 8669.
17	(Whereupon, the document
18	referred to as Services
19	Exhibit No. 70 was marked
20	for identification.)
21	Q That's fine.
22	MR. JOSEPH: And I would offer

1	this document, as well.
2	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Any objection
3	to Exhibit 70?
4	MR. HANDZO: No, Your Honor.
5	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Without
6	objection, Exhibit 70 is admitted.
7	(Whereupon, the document
8	referred marked for
9	identification as
10	Services Exhibit No. 70
11	was received
12	into evidence.)
13	BY MR. JOSEPH:
14	Q Now, I would ask you, Dr.
15	Pelcovits, take a look at document 69, which
16	is the statement of Commissioner Thompson in
17	connection with the merger. Among other
18	things, at the top of the second paragraph,
19	Commissioner Thompson notes the history of
20	facilitating practices, is the word he uses.
20	facilitating practices, is the word he uses.  Can you tell us what facilitating practices

1	A Generally, that's a term used to
2	describe practices that enable or facilitate
3	the practice of coordinated behavior among
4	firms in an industry.
5	Q And he also refers to practices
6	referring ranging from alleged anti-
7	competitive minimum advertising price programs
8	to agreements to fixed prices unlimited
9	advertising. Let me ask you if you are
10	familiar with the alleged anti-competitive
11	minimum advertised price program that
12	Commissioner Thompson is referring to?
13	A I might have reviewed it at one
14	point, I don't recall it at this point.
15	Q Well, let me see if we can refresh
16	your recollection.
17	Do you recall reviewing this
18	document or a document about the subject
19	matter discussed in this document in
20	connection with your review of the sound
21	recording industry?
22	(Whereupon, the document

1		referred to as Services
2		Exhibit No. 71 was marked
3		for identification.)
4	A	I do not recall reviewing this.
5	Q	You don't. Do you recall the
6	subject mat	ter?
7	A	If you give me a minute, please?
8	Q	Sure. Take your time.
9	A	Does this have a date on it for
10	the	
11	Q	I believe the only date that it
12	has on it	is the web, the URL date, which
13	shows Septe	ember 2000 or 2000/09.
14	A	Okay. Thank you.
15		I'm sorry, is the question did I,
16	have I reli	ed on this and reviewed this?
17	Q	Have you reviewed that document in
18	connection	with your review of the recording
19	industries?	
20	A	I have not.
21	Q	Were you aware when you considered
22	whether or	not the sound recording industry

1	was workably competitive that the Federal
2	Trade Commission had filed a complaint in
3	September of 2000 against the major record
4	companies after finding, among other things,
5	that they had engaged in anti-competitive
6	conduct facilitating horizontal collusion in
7	connection with the sale of CDs?
8	A I was not aware of this specific
9	proceeding. I am aware that there have been
10	a variety of anti-trust investigations of the
11	record industry.
12	Q When you say anti-trust
13	investigations, as one who has experience in
14	anti-trust matters, is it your understanding
15	that the issuance of a complaint and the
16	acceptance of a consent decree is the same as
17	simply an investigation when its pursued by
18	the FTC?
19	A No.
20	Q And what's the difference?
21	A Consent decree is the resolution

of a complaint. So, it obviously is a -- I

would say it provides more basis for believing
that the issues raised in the complaint are,
have some higher probability of being proven
than those where there's purely a complaint
without a consent decree.
Q It is true, is it not, that the
FTC won't issue a complaint unless they find
reason to believe that violations of the anti-
trust laws have occurred. Correct?
A I don't know whether that's their
operating standard, whether it's a reason to
believe basis or I'm not sure.
Q You don't know their operating
standard?
A Not for issuing a complaint, I
don't know what the operating standard is.
Q By the way, turning back to the
letters, Exhibits 67 and 68, to understand
formally what the FTC did, it would be correct
to say that it decided not to take enforcement
action. Correct?
A That is the formal declaration and

1	that is essentially the same, it has the same
2	effect as a finding that the merger does not
3	violate anti-trust law.
4	Q Well it's true, is it not, sir,
5	that the letter says this action is not to be
6	construed as a determination that a violation
7	may not have occurred?
8	A That's what it says.
9	Q Now with respect to the European
10	Commission Decision you said you reviewed, did
11	you consider that decision to be a reliable
12	discussion of the relevant markets related to
13	the sound recording industry?
14	A I considered their finding and
15	their approval of the merger as supportive of
16	the statement that I made in testimony and
17	deposition that the recording industry is
18	workably competitive. That's the degree to
19	which I relied on it.
20	Q Did you examine the specific
21	discussion of the online music market?
22	A I do recall a discussion in the

1	decision on that.
2	Q More than well, let me hear
3	what my question was again, please.
4	(Question read back.)
5	BY MR. JOSEPH:
6	Q And did you examine that
7	discussion
8	A I wasn't able to hear it, could
9	you please repeat it?
10	Q Well, let me just ask a question.
11	Did you examine and rely on the discussion of
12	the online music market in forming your
13	opinion that the industry was workably
14	competitive?
L5	A Not specifically, no.
L6	Q By the way, do you have an
L7	understanding of the laws governing European
L8	Commission review of mergers, generally?
L9	A I have a I can't say that I can
20	recall the exact wording of the laws, but I've
21	lived through merger approval processes in
22	Europe, been there, sat through proceedings

1	Q Would you sorry.
2	A So, I've had I know it from
3	experience, not from reading the law.
4	Q And is it your understanding that
5	the laws of the European Union impose very
6	specific requirements on the commission before
7	it can successfully challenge a merger?
8	A I don't recall specific
9	requirements. I recall, from experience, the
10	nature of the way they proceed and how they
11	look at anti-trust issues. And I'd say it's
12	comparable, if not more aggressive than the
13	U.S. anti-trust authorities.
14	Q Is it your understanding that the
15	Commission has to develop a cogent and
16	consistent body of evidence that supports each
17	of several specific elements in order to
18	challenge a merger?
19	A I did not recall that's the exact
20	standard.
21	Q Do you know whether or not the
22	burden of proof is on the Commission or on the

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1	merging parties in a European Commission
2	proceeding challenging a merger?
3	A I believe it's on the Commission
4	to prove it.
5	Q By the way, just so when the Board
6	looks at this decision, could you please turn
7	to page 73 I'm sorry, paragraph 73 on page
8	25. And the Commission speaks about examining
9	whether any price coordination on the basis of
10	a parallelism in average prices could have
11	been reached using certain list prices. Can
12	you tell do you have an understanding of
13	what the term parallelism means in this
14	context?
15	A I don't recall specifically what
16	they're referring to. I'd have to go back and
17	reread more of the decision.
18	Q Do you have a general
19	understanding in the context of anti-trust
20	analysis what the term pricing parallelism, or
21	what the term parallelism in connection with
22	prices means?

Well, I assume it's -- I mean, Α what I would expect is it's referring to price coordination because that's modifying the The Commission first part of the sentence. any price coordination. examined whether There are various ways of looking at price You can be looking at the coordination. actual data on the prices and one part of the examination is whether the prices are the same over time for the firms that are alleged to be I assume that's what coordinating prices. it's referring to. Exactly how they use there and what they said about it, I don't recall. Your Honor, MR. JOSEPH: And,

MR. JOSEPH: And, Your Honor, we're actually on page 25, paragraph 73.

BY MR. JOSEPH:Q.And in the next sentence, there's a reference to the term to determine whether certain discounts were sufficiently transparent in order to allow sufficient monitoring of any price coordination. Do you have an understanding of what the term transparent means when it's used

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1	in that context?
2	A Yes. I think that that's
3	referring to whether the discounts being
4	granted by firm A are known to firm B, so that
5	they can see what the prices, the effect of
6	prices in the market. I can expand if you
7	want me to.
8	Q No, I think that's fine. That's a
9	good basic concept.
10	Are you aware, Dr. Pelcovits, that
11	in its decision, the European Commission
12	determined that the market for online music
13	licenses from the record companies was a
14	distinct market that deserved analysis?
15	A Yes, they said that. And I will
16	just add they said that there were to be exact
17	elimination of markets can be left open, the
18	competitive assessment is the same under any
19	market definition considered. Paragraph 29.
20	Q Is it not true, Dr. Pelcovits,
21	that that statement actually referred to the
22	question of whether online downloading and

1	streaming were part of the same market for
2	distribution of online music or whether they
3	formed separate markets?
4	A Yes.
5	Q So that doesn't go to the question
6	of whether the markets for wholesale licenses
7	for online distribution is itself a market,
8	does it?
9	A Not directly. I think it goes to
10	the general point of careful delineation of
11	these markets is not always the most important
12	part of an anti-trust investigation.
13	Q But, in this case, if you turn to
14	paragraph 24 on page 8, it's true, is it not
15	that the Commission considered online music is
16	not part of the market for physical recorded
17	music and two different markets must, their
18	words must, be distinguished, one of which was
19	the wholesale market for licenses of online
20	music. Correct?
21	A Yes, correct.
22	Q That's what they found in the

1	Sony-BMG case. Correct?
2	A That's correct.
3	Q Now let me ask you to turn to page
4	6 of your report or I should say, of your
5	written direct testimony.
6	A I have it. Thank you.
7	Q In the only full paragraph on the
8	page, six lines up from the bottom, you say,
9	and this is in well, you say that if the
10	price is too high and, in context, I take it
11	that's the price set by this Board or by the
12	prior CARP. Correct?
13	A Correct.
14	Q Parties can (and indeed are almost
15	certain to) negotiate agreements for rates
16	lower than the statutory standard. That was
17	your testimony. Correct?
18	A Correct.
19	Q Now, you wouldn't expect the same
20	effect in a market where the sellers sit
21	together and plan a common strategy for
22	pricing in the market, would you?

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A Well, that would, that would depend on the specific circumstances.

Q Well, if the sellers can be affective at maintaining discipline among themselves, you wouldn't expect that same result to obtain, would you?

A It still might.

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Q But you would expect a different outcome, wouldn't you?

A different than if there was not Α a perfect discipline among the parties. There would still be an issue whether the industry as a whole would get more revenue by lowering It might still be the same prices prices. but, if by lowering prices you were to increase demand sufficiently to offset the margin, that would still reduced profitable strategy. And my sense is that, again, we're dealing with an industry where price competition among the different titles of records does not seem to be an important competitive variable.

1	Q Dr. Pelcovits, do you remember
2	when I asked you essentially those same
3	questions at your deposition?
4	A I remember the general topic.
5	Thank you.
6	(Whereupon, the document
7	referred to as Services
8	Exhibit No. 72 was marked
9	for identification.)
10	BY MR. JOSEPH:
11	Q Let's see what your answer was
12	when I asked you then. Would you please turn
13	to page 71 or pages 71 and 72. It's actually
14	on page 19 of the four
15	A Oh.
16	Q This format puts four deposition
17	pages together on a page.
18	A I'm sorry, page 70?
19	Q 71.
20	A 71.
21	Q It starts on line 24
22	A Okay.

1	Q where I ask, would you expect
2	the same effect to apply in a market where the
3	sellers sit together to plan a common strategy
4	for pricing in the market. And you said that
5	if you were in a situation whereas you posited
6	in the question, the sellers are sitting
7	together to set prices, as a general matter,
8	if they can be affective at maintaining
9	discipline among yourselves, you're going to
10	get a different outcome than if they act
11	independently. It's just the nature of
12	cartels versus competition.
13	That was your answer then.
14	Correct?
15	A Yes.
16	Q And that's an accurate answer?
17	A Yes.
18	Q By the way, let me ask you to
19	assume hypothetically that the members of such
20	a group that was coordinating pricing knew
21	that any agreement that they entered into
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below the price that they were trying to reach

would become through discovery in a legal proceeding and would be useful as evidence against the goals of setting the common price, that would be a strong disincentive to undercutting the price, wouldn't it?

A I suppose it's possible.

Q Okay, Dr. Pelcovits, let's turn to page -- it's your written report and I would ask if it's correct from page 30 to page 42 of the report where you described how you derived your recommendation for a per subscriber fee for the sound recording license in the non-interactive, in the target market, from the per subscriber fee for the sound recording license in the benchmark market?

A Yes.

Q And I believe, when you were talking with Mr. Steinthal earlier, you testified that the assumption that the ratio of the consumer price to the royalty rate would be the same in both the target and the benchmark markets was a key to your analysis.

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1	Correct?
2	A Yes.
3	Q And I believe you said, on direct,
4	that you believed that that assumption was
5	correct because you believed the demand
6	elasticity in both markets was likely to be
7	similar. Correct?
8	A Correct.
9	Q Okay. And just so the record is
10	clear, the demand elasticity is the
11	sensitivity of demand to changes in price.
12	Correct?
13	A Quantity and demand
14	Q As a general statement?
15	A is the change in percentage
16	change in the quantity of demand with respect
17	to a percentage change in the price.
18	Q Which is the numerator, which is
19	the denominator, the percentage change in
20	quantity or the percentage change in price?
21	A The numerator is the quantity, the
22	denominator is the price. So, I think high

į	elasticity means that there's a large quantity
	change in respect to a small price change.
	Just so we have the math right, we talk about
	this in absolute value terms because actually
	the number is negative. But conventionally,
	because price as price goes down quantity
	goes up but the convention is to say larger,
	smaller, even though we're dealing with a
	negative number.
	Q Thank you.
	A I just didn't want to get that
	confused.
	Q So now let's turn to page 33 of

Q So now let's turn to page 33 of your written statement and look at figure one. This figure describes graphically your discussion of the relationship between the license fee for sound recording rights paid by music services to the retail subscription fee paid by consumers. Correct?

A Yes, it's illustrating that relationship.

Q Now, your written statement on

1	pages 32 and 33 calls the line marked DMS, the							
2	demand curve for the interactive music							
3	services. Right?							
4	A Correct.							
5	Q But that's not strictly speaking							
6	what that line is, is it?							
7	A If we're trying to capture what's							
8	going on in the market, no, it's not strictly							
9	speaking. Correct.							
10	Q In fact, you intend the demand							
11	curve, line DMS, to be a demand curve facing							
12	a single music service. Correct?							
13	A I know I said that on deposition.							
14	I have to remember now whether it makes a							
15	difference whether it's a single music service							
16	or whether it's the music service business as							
17	a whole. I don't think it matters.							
18	Q Well, to be more accurate, didn't							
19	you describe it or is it not, the demand							
20	curve, is it not your testimony that it's the							
21	demand curve faced by a single music service							
22	with respect to the sound recordings of a							

1	single record company?							
2	A Right. That part is correct.							
3	It's with respect to the sound recordings of							
4	a particular record company.							
5	Q Now, the line marked DD you intend							
6	to be the derived demand of the service for							
7	the sound recording input from a single record							
8	company. Is that correct?							
9	A That's correct.							
10	Q And if that's true, then the point							
11	P would represent the portion of a license fee							
12	for a music service represented by the sound							
13	recordings of a single record company.							
14	Wouldn't it?							
15	A Yes.							
16	Q And the point F would represent							
17	the license fee paid by the music service to							
18	a single record company. Correct?							
19	A Correct.							
20	Q When you is there anywhere in							
21	your written testimony that you actually							
22	explained the meaning of those lines in terms							

1 | of a single record company?

A No.

Q And, in fact, on pages 35 and 36, you describe the points P and F quite differently than you've just described them in this testimony, don't you?

I apply them differently than how I described them earlier. I think we went through this in deposition and I distinguished what I was trying to sort of provide by way of explanation and just the graph and what I eventually did and how I applied it.

Q Well, if you would look with me, please, on page 36, in the paragraph at the bottom of the page, second sentence, you're saying as show in table one of Appendix A, which is your list of the contracts, the average per subscriber fee for copyright in the interactive market is \$2.97, corresponding to F on figure one. That's what you said in your testimony. Right?

A Correct.

1	Q But that's not in fact what point							
2	F represents, is it?							
3	A That's not what F represents in							
4	the picture, in the graph on page 33 and the							
5	economics of this still holds. And I was							
6	trying to make it clear. I, obviously, made							
7	it less clear.							
8	Q And you didn't tell the Board that							
9	actually the graph didn't represent what you							
LO	said it represented on page 36, did you?							
L1	A I have not amended testimony.							
L2	That's correct.							
L3	Q Let's turn to page 34 of your							
L4	written testimony. You say that the distance							
L5	excuse me one second.							
L6	The last full sentence in the							
L7	text, not in the footnotes, you say the							
L8	distance between the two demand curves is the							
L9	amount that would cover the other production							
20	costs of the music services including a							
21	reasonable profit margin. Correct?							
2	A Correct.							

Q Now, when you say the two demand					
curves, you're referring to the demand for the					
service and the derived demand for the					
license. Correct?					
A Correct.					
Q And those were the lines DMS,					
which is the demand for the service, and DD,					
which is the demand for the license. Correct?					
A Correct.					
Q And when you say the other					
production costs, you're referring to the					
production costs other than the sound					
recording license. Correct?					
A Correct.					
Q And you don't have any reason to					
believe that the production costs, plus a					
reasonable profit margin for non-interactive					
digital music services are any less than the					
production costs and a reasonable profit					
margin for interactive music services. Do					
you?					
A I do not.					

1	Q And so, if that's true, you would							
2	expect the distance between the demand curve							
3	facing the music service and the derived							
4	demand curve of the music services for							
5	licenses to be the same for interactive and							
6	non-interactive services. Correct?							
7	A Yes.							
8	Q Now, on page 34, you say that							
9	you've drawn the derived demand curve for							
10	sound recordings to be parallel to the demand							
11	curve for the music service. Correct?							
12	A Correct.							
13	Q And you actually give two reasons							
14	for doing that. Correct?							
15	A Yes.							
16	Q Okay. So, let's consider the							
17	combined significance of your assumptions.							
18	The distance between the derived demand curve							
19	and the service demand curve is equal to							
20	production costs plus a reasonable profit.							
21	There's no reason to believe that the							

production costs plus a reasonable profit for

the	intera	ctive	servic	es a	ind t	ne i	non-	
intera	active	servic	es dif	fer a	nd the	der	ived	
demand	d curve	and de	mand cu	ırves a	are par	ralle	1 to	
each o	other i	n both r	markets	s. Ass	suming	, as	your	
evidence shows, that the consumer subscription								
fee	for	non-in	teracti	ive	servic	es	are	
signi:	ficantl	y low	ver t	han	the	cons	umer	
subsci	ription	fee :	for in	teract	cive s	ervi	ces,	
isn't	it tru	e that	the ra	ation	of the	lic	ense	
fee	to th	e subs	scripti	ion f	ee f	or :	non-	
intera	active	servic	es mus	st be	signi	fica	ntly	
lower	than t	he rati	o of th	ne lice	ense fe	ee to	the	
subscription fee for the interactive services?								
	A A	.s we	stand	today	, or	as	the	

A As we stand today, or as the evidence in the market is today with the statutory rate, yes.

Q I'm not asking about as we stand with the statutory rate. I'm asking, based on the assumptions as you have made them in the market and your use of the benchmark and target markets?

A I think I'm confused about the

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

question then.

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When you talk about the derived 0 demand curve and the service demand curve for the interactive market and the non-interactive markets, you're not talking, when you're talking about the non-interactive market, about the market that we find under the statutory license, you're talking about your hypothetical target market, aren't you?

I'm observing prices Α Well. if today, which is, if you're asking what is the relationship between the license fee and the retail price for interactive services, what's in the market today does not represent what would occur if the license fee I'm proposing were adopted.

Well, let me ask the question with 0 -- you're taking your same three assumptions. If you assume that the consumer subscription non-interactive services for fee are than the significantly lower consumer subscription fee for interactive services,

isn't it true that the ratio of the license fee to the subscription fee for non-interactive services must be significantly lower than the ratio of the license fee to the subscription fee for interactive services?

A Yes.

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Q Let's take an example using rough numbers. Let's assume that in the interactive market, the average per subscriber license fee is \$3 and the average consumer subscription fee is \$8. That leaves imputed production costs plus a reasonable profit of \$5. Right?

A Right.

Let's assume in the non-Q interactive market, the average subscription fee is \$6, where these are all per month numbers, as you've used throughout, if you assume that the same production costs plus a reasonable profit apply in the non-interactive market and that's the same \$5, isn't it true that the appropriate license fee indicated by non-interactive transmission service the

1	derived demand curve would be \$6 minus the \$5
2	or \$1?
3	A No.
4	Q And why not?
5	A You're assuming that prices
6	you're taking evidence from what prices are
7	right now and saying what the fee should be
8	without allowing the market to adjust for the
9	higher fee.
10	Q I wasn't taking any evidence. I
11	was asking you to assume average subscription
12	fees. Are you saying that under your model
13	the subscription fee for the non-interactive
14	services would exceed the subscription fee for
15	the interactive services?
16	A No.
17	Q So, they're going to be less?
18	A It depends on demand. I expect
19	that it would be less, yes. They are less
20	now. I'd expect them to continue to be less.
21	Q Well, didn't your model actually
22	rely on the subscription fees that you

1	observed in the marketplace?
2	A In order to measure the value to
3	consumers of interactivity or the difference
4	in value between an interactive and non-
5	interactive.
6	Q Isn't that exactly what I was
7	doing when I was taking the assumption that
8	the subscription fees let me rephrase.
9	Isn't that exactly what I was
10	doing when I was taking the assumption that
11	the price charged to consumers for
12	subscription services was \$8 and the price
13	charged to consumers for non-subscription
14	services was \$6? I was just doing the same
15	kind of analysis you were with round numbers.
16	A No, you weren't.
17	Q How was I doing something
18	different?
19	A You were getting a rate based on
20	existing prices in the market. And the
21	existing prices in the non-interactive market
	,

are a function of the rate that was set by the

1	prior CARP. And the relationship between the
2	fee and the price in the market is, again,
3	driven by the existing CARP set rate.
4	Q Was it valid for you, when you
5	looked at the price consumers were willing to
6	pay in the marketplace, to look at the average
7	prices paid by consumers for non-interactive
8	services?
9	A Yes.
10	Q And when you did that, you found a
11	number. Correct?
12	A Yes.
13	Q And if you subtract from that
14	number that you found the same reasonable
15	I'm sorry the same production cost plus a
16	reasonable profit number that you found to
17	exist in the interactive services market,
18	isn't it true that you would actually come out
19	with a negative fee?
20	A Yes.
21	Q Now on page 34, Dr. Pelcovits, in
22	your assumption that the demand, the derived
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demand curves are parallel, you gave two reasons I think I mentioned earlier. First, you said that sound recordings are a non-substitutable input and second, you said that you assumed that any change in the copyright fee -- I'll withdraw this question actually. I'm sorry.

On page 36 of your testimony you state that it's reasonable to assume that the demand elasticities in the interactive and non-interactive markets would be very close. That's been talked about before. But it's true, is it not, that the availability of different substitutes for the two different kinds of services could lead to different demand elasticities in their respective markets?

A Yes.

Q And other than what you've described in footnote 14, you did not perform any analysis of the demand elasticity in either the benchmark or the target market, did

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1	you?
2	A Correct.
3	Q And it's also true, is it not,
4	that the concept of elasticity of demand for
5	non-subscription services has a very different
6	meaning than the concept of elasticity of
7	demand for subscription services because the
8	customer is not paying the price in the non-
9	subscription model. Correct?
10	A It is a different market
11	elasticity. It doesn't mean the concept does
12	not apply.
13	Q Well, it's true, is it not, that
14	the term elasticity would have a very
15	different meaning?
16	A It would have a different
17	application. Can I say it's a different
18	meaning? If I would still say it's not a
19	different meaning. It's a different
20	application. That's quibbling over words, but
21	essentially, I think that's a better way to
22	put it.

Q Just to be clear, it's true, is it
not, that your analysis of the percentage of
revenue fee in the non-interactive market,
just as your analysis of the per subscriber
fee also depends on your assumption that the
ratio of the license fee to the subscription
price in the hypothetical non-interactive
market is the same as the ratio of the license
fee to the subscription price in the
interactive market?

A I was -- sorry. I was distracted in the middle of the question. I apologize.

Q On page 42, if you -- make it easier, I think, if you look at the third sentence, fourth sentence.

If, as I have said, the ratio of license fees to subscription price charged to consumers is the same in the interactive and non-interactive markets, the same percentage of revenue fee would be charged in both markets. I just want it to be clear that that assumption is in fact a key assumption of your

analysis to derive the percentage of revenue 1 rate also, is it not? 2 I'm a little confused exactly what 3 the question is different from what I've said 4 But I said that the same relationship 5 here. between subscription fees and subscription 6 7 prices follow, the logic follows through from subscription fee recommendation through to the 8 9 revenue recommendation. 10 Let me ask my original question 0 again, and see if it's easier. 11 I'm not trying to be difficult, 12 Α 13 I'm just having a hard time --14 I just want to ask if it's true 0 15 that your analysis of the percentage of 16 revenue fee, like your analysis of the per 17 subscriber fee, depends on your assumption that the ratio of the license fee to the 18 19 subscription price in the target and the 20 benchmark markets is the same? Or should be the same, is what I 21 Α 22 would say.

1	Q Let me ask you to look at pages
2	183 and 184 of your deposition. Page 47 of
3	the transcript that I've given you. Now,
4	turning to your
5	I asked you, at your deposition,
6	turning to your varivation of the percentage
7	of revenue fee, is it true that that
8	determination also depends on the assumption
9	that the ratio of the license fee to the
10	subscription price in the NI-DAT market is the
11	same as in the I-DAT market? And you said,
12	yes, although to clarify, it's not that it is
13	right now, but that it would be in a market
14	without a statutorily set fee.
15	Is that a correct answer?
16	A That's correct.
17	Q Okay.
18	A That's exactly what I tried to say
19	a minute ago.
20	Q Okay. And on page let's see.
21	Turn now to page 43 of your written testimony.
22	You state that it's your understanding that
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1	under the interactive DAT contracts, under the
2	structure of the agreements that you reviewed,
3	payments are usually not made on the basis of
4	a per play rate. Correct?
5	A I recall saying that. I don't see
6	where you're pointing me to.
7	Q Okay.
8	UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It's in the
9	written testimony.
10	BY MR. JOSEPH:
11	Q Oh, it's in the written testimony.
12	I'm sorry.
13	A Okay. So, I'm sorry, what page?
14	Q 43.
15	A Okay, thanks. Yes. Now, I see
16	exactly what you're referring to and yes,
17	that's what I said.
18	Q What was the source of your
19	information for that statement?
20	A The source is the testimonies of
21	the record company witnesses that I list at
22	the bottom of the paragraph.

1	Q Did you actually review the
2	payment history under the interactive
3	agreements?
4	A No.
5	Q Let me ask you to turn to page 8
6	of your testimony, written testimony. And
7	there you say that, toward the bottom, one of
8	the reasons to use your benchmark market, is
9	that there are "statistically meaningful
10	data?"
11	A Yes, sir.
12	Q And on page 12 of your testimony
13	you say that information of prices in the
14	candidate market, and I take it by that you
15	mean candidate market to be a benchmark,
16	A Correct.
17	Q must be available and
18	statistically valid.
19	A Yes.
20	Q Correct? Now, by statistically
21	valid and meaningful, you mean, do you not,
22	that the dispersion of the data is relatively

small, as measured by such measures as variants or standard deviation?

Ι I think I mean more than that. Α think it means that the data is clearly of marketplace representing the nature transactions. And, I would say also it has good statistical properties that to the extent it's either is variation, that there explainable or it's not so great as to make any statistical inferences invalid.

Q But one of the conditions of statistically meaningful or statistically valid data is that the data are -- that the dispersion of the data is relatively small, as measured by statistical measures. Correct?

A I might have put it that way at one point, but I think it's better to say that it's dispersion is explainable or not so widespread that it makes the inferences invalid. I'm just trying to be a little more precise.

O Well, let me ask you to look at

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1	page 126 of your deposition, which is on page
2	33 of the transcript that you've got. And I
3	ask what you meant by statistically meaningful
4	data and you said then, primarily the
5	dispersion of data as measured by variant or
6	variants, I suspect is what you had said,
7	standard deviation or other measures is
8	relatively small, so you can assign pretty
9	high confidence to the averages or means.
10	Correct?
11	A Yes.
12	Q And that's what you meant, at
13	least, when I was taking your deposition.
14	Correct?
15	A I mean it know. I'm a little
16	fuller here in terms giving a broader
17	explanation.
18	Q Okay. It's possible, is it not,
19	that tightly grouped data in prices can be a
20	sign of parallelism and pricing of a kind that
21	can indicate anti-competitive behavior, isn't

it?

1	A It is possible.
2	Q And, Dr. Pelcovits, did you
3	perform any analysis of the probability that
4	in a competitive market where prices were set
5	wholly without reference to the other record
6	companies, every one but one of the 17
7	agreements that you looked at would have a per
8	play fee that was exactly the same?
9	A Is the question am I aware of
10	that? Yes.
11	Q No, my
12	A I'm sorry.
13	Q question was, did you perform
14	any analysis of the probability
15	A Oh, sorry.
16	Q that that would be so in a
17	competitive market where the prices are set
18	wholly without reference to other companies?
19	A I did not perform any analysis of
20	that. And I think, as I said, that that's
21	never the price actually paid. So, my sense
22	is it really is not telling you that much

1	about issues of parallelism of any sort or
2	Q But it is the number that finds
3	its way into 16 of the 17 agreements, is it
4	not?
5	A Yes.
6	Q And in the other agreement, there
7	is no per play price. Correct?
8	A Correct.
9	Q Now, Dr. Pelcovits, I would ask
10	you to turn to page 48 of your written
11	statement. There you say that the claim that
12	radio promotes the sale of sound recordings
13	ignores the impact of radio on the amount of
14	time spent listening to recorded music.
15	Correct?
16	A Correct.
17	Q Did you examine quantitatively or
18	qualitatively the impact of radio listening on
19	the amount of time consumers spend listening
20	to recorded music?
21	A I did not do it. I read the
22	studies referred to here by Professor

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1	Liebowitz. I did not conduct my own analysis.
2	Q You say the studies. In fact, you
3	read one paper there, correct?
4	A I cited one paper. He's written a
5	variety of papers. This is, I think, the
6	primary empirical piece that he's done.
7	Q Did you examine any information
8	about the amount of money that the record
9	companies spend to encourage radio stations to
10	play their recordings?
11	A I did not do any specific
12	analysis. I have read about that in various
13	depositions, transcripts. So, I understand
14	that there is an effort and an expenditure by
15	record companies to get and promote their
16	music at radio stations.
17	Q And you wouldn't expect record
18	companies to make those expenditures, if they
19	didn't believe those expenditures were
20	valuable to them, did you, would you?
21	A I would not.
22	Q Now, on page 49 of your written

testimony, you say that even if one were to assume, and this is at the top of the second full paragraph after third, that over-the-air radio, overall, increased record sales. It's an enormous unsupported leap to claim that webcasting is promotional.

You didn't mean to say, in saying that, that's it's an equally enormous leap to say that internet simulcasts of radio broadcasts to the same audience is promotional, did you?

A I wouldn't say it would be to the same degree a leap, the same size of a leap. I think it's still something to be considered, but it might not be the same if its customers have a wider choice of stations to choose from when they're on the internet.

Q That's not something you've considered, though, and certainly wasn't something you considered at the time of your deposition, was it?

A That's -- I didn't consider it one

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	way or the other in this testimony.
2	Q Now, you refer to the Liebowitz
3	article. Do you recall that one of the
4	analysis Profession Liebowitz did, and I think
5	there were two empirical discussions in his
6	paper, was to review the paper surrounding the
7	introduction and growth of the radio industry
8	and its effect on the recording industry?
9	A That was one of two. The other
10	was looking at the UK where they started, for
11	the first time, to have a radio station that
12	broadcasts rock music, which was more recent.
13	But there were two studies, yes.
14	Q Let's talk about the first one
15	first.
16	A Sure.
17	Q The time period he reviewed
18	included the great depression, did it not?
19	A I recall, it's a long time ago, I
20	think it might very well have included that.
21	Q It included the introduction of
22	talking motion pictures, did it not?

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1	A I expect it did, yes.
2	Q There were major differences in
3	the technology of that time than today, were
4	there not?
5	A I agree.
6	Q For example, the acoustic quality
7	of early radio was significantly better than
8	the acoustic quality of early sound
9	recordings. Do you remember him discussing
10	that?
11	A I do not recall that.
12	Q Do you remember that, in the days
13	he was looking at, sound recording lasted for
14	four minutes and then you had to flip the
15	side?
16	A I even remember those, those vinyl
17	records, yes.
18	Q And is it not true that Professor
19	Liebowitz himself says that the imprecision in
20	these data, the fluidity of the content and
21	technology, and the changing market
22	conditions, all make it impossible to have a

1	totally clear-cut test of the impact of radio
2	on the recording industry?
3	A I don't recall that, but I think
4	that's a reasonable statement, certainly for
5	the first study.
6	Q And the second study was performed
7	in Great Brittan, which you will agree is a
8	different country with a different culture?
9	A They are a different country with
10	a different culture but it's more recent and,
11	in fact, I thought it was a very nice of
12	empirical work to look at the UK.
13	Q And his conclusion, is it not, was
14	that the evidence for any effect is weak?
15	A Yes.
16	Q Now, Professor Liebowitz examined
17	the overall impact of radio on overall record
18	sales in his discussion, didn't he?
19	A Yes.
20	Q But from the standpoint of an
21	individual record company, its concern would
22	be with whether the airplay of its records

increased their sales. Correct?

A Whether the airplay of -- it could really be two things. One, would lowering the price of their licenses lead to increased play and second, would increased play lead to greater CD sales?

Q When we're talking about over-theair radio, we're not talking about the price of licenses

are we?

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A Correct.

Let me ask you to take a look at 0 page 49 to 50 of your testimony where you, starting on page 49 at the bottom, you say spent listening to non-interactive time digital audio transmission services must be coming from one of several alternative uses of listening listening time, to CDs, to interactive digital transmission services, listening to terrestrial radio, or other activities, e.g., watching TV. That's what you said?

1	A Yes.
2	Q Aware you aware that a substantial
3	amount of the time spent listening to non-
4	interactive webcasting is in the office?
5	A Yes.
6	Q So, isn't it possible that a
7	substantial amount of time spent listening to
8	non-interactive webcasting is time that would
9	otherwise be spent listening to nothing, but
10	just working?
11	A I would say, again, the same type
12	of options would be there, such as listening
13	to interactive DATs or playing CDs or now we
14	have, you know, little MP3 players. So, there
15	are all sorts of options available at work, at
16	home.
17	Q Have you done any study or
18	analysis of the extent to which people play
19	CDs or listen to MP3 players in the office?
20	A I have not done any study, no.
21	Q Now, in your sensitivity analysis
22	of the affect of a decrease in CD purchases by

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1	two, of a differential decrease in CD
2	purchases of two, you assume that he margin on
3	CDs is about \$5.60. Correct?
4	A Correct.
5	Q Did that margin include the value
6	of the CD sale to the record company as well
7	as the recording artist, or just to the record
8	company?
9	A It included just to the record
10	company.
11	Q Did you consider whether
12	interactive services which consist of
13	downloads may substitute more for permanent
14	digital downloads than non-interactive
15	streaming services in addition to the greater
16	substitution effect on the sale of CDs that
17	you describe in your testimony?
18	A I did not consider that as a
19	separate affect the two CDs should be, in my
20	mind, considered as a differential whether
21	it's CDs or some combination of CDs and
22	digital downloads. So, it's some other

purchase of recorded music. 1 You would agree, would you not 2 0 though, that the margins made by the record 3 companies on digital downloads are greater 4 than the margins made in CD sales? 5 On a percentage basis, they are 6 Α On an album basis, they are maybe 7 about a dollar or so higher. And, overall, 8 whether there is a greater margin or not, 9 probably is influenced a lot by how many 10 11 tracks of an album a customer downloads. So 12 that if a customer downloads five tracks out 13 of an album, then the margin will be lower 14 from a digital download than buying a CD. 15 To your knowledge, did the \$5.60 0 number that you used come from anything other 16 17 than the sale of physical CDs? Α It did not. 18 Now, at the bottom of page 51, you 19 say that in computing the price difference 20 21 caused by your assumed substitution difference non-interactive 22 and between interactive

1	markets, you assumed a linear demand curve.
2	Correct?
3	A Yes.
4	Q And, in fact, the resulting change
5	in price that's half the margin on the CD is
6	a direct result of that. Correct?
7	A Correct.
8	Q Did you perform any analysis to
9	determine the appropriate shape of the demand
10	curve?
11	A No.
12	Q In the regression analysis that
13	you spoke with Mr. Steinthal earlier, in
14	figure, in table 6.1 of your testimony on page
15	39, were there any radio simulcasting
16	services, by that I mean radio broadcasters
17	who simulcast their programming on the
18	internet, contained in that regression
19	analysis?
20	A Not as separate observations.
21	Some of them, some of the simulcasting is
22	carried by some of the pay services. So, only
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1	indirect.
2	Q Do you know the extent to which
3	simulcasts were factored into this analysis?
4	A No. I can't measure that.
5	Q And you didn't take any pure
6	simulcasting services, did you?
7	A I did not take any pure simulcast
8	because there is no price to the consumer and
9	I based this on the price paid by the
10	consumer.
11	Q Is that another way of saying
12	simulcasters are non-subscription services?
13	A Yes, thank you.
14	Q In your regression analysis, one
15	of your variables, we can go back and look at
16	it if we need to, but I only have one more
17	question on it, so we'll see if we can
18	MR. JOSEPH: on that, Your
19	Honor, not for the entire cross-examination.
20	BY MR. JOSEPH:
21	Q You had a variable marked quality
22	and you had a line, most of the services, in

1	fact as I recall and this is just a memory
2	test, all but one said high and one said
3	medium. Can you tell me the break point in
4	your analysis between high quality and medium
5	quality?
6	A I do not recall the breakpoint,
7	no.
8	Q Let me ask you to turn to page 12
9	of your testimony. In discussing the common
10	characteristics of the interactive and non-
11	interactive markets, your target and benchmark
12	markets, you identify, as a common
13	characteristic, the similarity of the buyers.
14	Are there any radio broadcasters in the
15	benchmark marketplace that you examined?
16	A There are none except, as I said
17	earlier, indirectly through the airage of
18	those stations by the subscription services.
19	Q And except to the extent that you
20	haven't quantified, and haven't attempted to
21	quantify, you are not aware of any radio
22	simulcasters that were direct purchasers in

1	the benchmark market, are you?
2	A Correct.
3	Q And there certainly were no radio
4	broadcasters in the 17 benchmark agreements
5	that you considered, were there?
6	A That's correct.
7	Q On page 14 of your testimony, you
8	say that music services that use the statutory
9	license often, I'm sorry, offer channels
10	targeted to particular generas, themes, or
11	subgeneras of music and that listeners car
12	select from among many subgeneras. Correct?
13	A Correct.
14	Q Now by genres, I take it, you mear
15	the dozen or so types of music that you see
16	categorized in <u>Arbitron</u> and other
17	publications?
18	A Yes.
19	Q And by subgeneras, you mean
20	subcategories of those genre?
21	A Yes.
22	Q Such as music specific to a time

period or a particular style?

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A Yes, a style, time period, all sorts of different ways of categorizing the music that you see on these interactive websites.

Q You did not examine, did you, whether radio stations that simulcast their programming typically provide narrow subgeneras of music or more commonly provide the broad genres such as those listed in Arbitron and similar publications, did you?

A I am aware that radio stations, by and large, are not as narrowly targeted as the options available on the subscription services.

Q On page 13 of your testimony, as one of the similar experiences for the consumer, you identify the ability, I'm sorry, you identify the option to receive commercial free service as important to your comparison of that consumer experience for interactive and non-interactive services. Correct?

1	A That's correct.
2	Q And, in fact, you believe whether
3	or not a service contained commercials in its
4	streams would be an important consideration
5	for consumers, don't you?
6	A I do.
7	Q You also believe that right now
8	it's very hard to assess or measure the
9	advertising market. Correct?
10	A I didn't say it's very hard to
11	assess it, I said that it's a very dynamic
12	market and there's I did not do an
13	assessment of the advertising market.
14	Q Let me ask you to look at page 202
15	of your deposition transcript, which is on
16	page 52 of the document you've got there. And
17	we were talking generally about the difference
18	between subscription services and advertising
19	services. And in your answer to my question
20	about how, let's see, how those services
21	differ, the differences change over time, you
22	said on line 14, we don't have evidence in the

1	market of what it's going to look like over
2	the entire next five years, so it's very hard
3	to assess or measure the advertising market
4	right now.
5	A Yes.
6	Q And you believed that when you
7	said it?
8	A I believe it now. Whether it's
9	one way or another, I did not assess it. I
10	think it's hard to assess and measure. I
11	still believe that now.
12	Q On recommending a rate for non-
13	subscription services, does your analysis
14	consider how the music quality of those
15	services compare to the music quality of
16	subscription services?
17	A It does not. It does not set any
18	different in rate based on the quality of the
19	broadcast that the subscription or non-
20	subscription webcaster would use.
21	Q And in recommending a rate for
22	non-subscription services, you didn't consider

1	the number of channels or streams offered by
2	non-subscription services, compared to
3	subscription services, did you?
4	A That's true.
5	Q And you'd expect the number of
6	channels or streams to be important to
7	consumers when they value a service, wouldn't
8	You?
9	A Yes.
10	MR. JOSEPH: May I have a moment,
11	Your Honor?
12	Thank you, Dr. Pelcovits. Thank
13	you, your Honor, I have no further questions.
14	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Ms. Brown,
15	any cross-examination?
16	While we transition, why don't we
17	take a ten minute recess?
18	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter
19	went off the record at 3:18 p.m. and went back
20	on the record at 3:30 p.m.)
21	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Thank you.
22	We will come to order.

1	Ms. Brown?
2	BY MS. BROWN:
3	Q Good afternoon, Dr. Pelcovits,
4	Kris Brown on behalf of NPR.
5	A Good afternoon.
6	Q I'd like to draw your attention to
7	page 5 of your testimony, written testimony.
8	At the bottom of the page, in the last
9	paragraph, you state I also assume that both
10	the willing buyer and willing seller in this
11	hypothetical marketplace are commercial
12	entities fully motivated to maximize profits.
13	And then you go on, on page 6 to say thus,
14	I do not attempt to set separate rates for
15	noncommercial entities or hobbyists that are
16	not seeking to maximize profit or even those
17	small webcasters that may be unable to survive
18	without the benefit of a below market
19	statutory license.
20	A Yes, I see that.
21	Q Okay. So I just want to clarify,
22	you never made any attempt to derive a rate

1	for noncommercial entities, including National
2	Public Radio in your analysis. Is that
3	correct?
4	A I did not try to derive a separate
5	rate for those entities, no.
6	Q Okay. But you would agree,
7	wouldn't you, that the statutory standard does
8	not preclude setting a rate for public
9	broadcasting and non-commercial entities,
10	isn't that correct?
11	A To my best recollection, that's
12	correct.
13	Q Okay. And do you agree, don't
14	you, that the buyers, the willing buyers, as
15	you conceptualize them, are not comparable as
16	between public broadcasters and commercial
17	webcasters, isn't that correct?
18	A I'd agree with that.
19	Q And would you agree that it's
20	possible that a willing seller might have an
21	interest in setting more than one rate if
22	market segmentation of the consumers were

1	possible?
2	A If it would be a segmentation that
3	would segment consumers, yes, but not
4	necessarily of producers selling to the same
5	consumers.
6	MS. BROWN: Okay. No further
7	questions.
8	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Mr. Malone,
9	would you like to inquire?
10	BY MR. MALONE:
11	Q Good afternoon, Dr. Pelcovits.
12	This morning, Mr. Joseph was
13	asking you in the anti-trust context about
14	interactive licenses and, as I caught it, your
15	testimony was that interactive licenses were
16	"one of the many markets in which sound
17	recordings are provided and then you went on
18	to say that record companies use multiple
19	channels to distribute these products. And
20	would you consider these to be examples of
21	market segmentation?

Not in the sense of the question I

just answered from Ms. Brown. Market
segmentation can mean simply markets that are
different based on the characteristics of the
supply side and, namely, you can provide
something in one channel using a variety of
different techniques of delivering it, let's
say, how you get it to the car versus how you
get it to the home? It can also be, from a
demand side, you're going to try to segment
consumers in a way to maximize profits.
Q But let's see if I can build on
that. Consider the analogy to private
labeling in the grocery store and Dole
provides certain fruits under the Dole label
and they also provide certain fruits under the
Giant label and these sell to the consumer at
different prices. And Dole receives different
prices from the grocery store, does it not?
A I don't know that for a fact but -
_
Q Well

-- I'll carry that forward, carry

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1	the assumption
2	Q All right.
3	A forward is fine for me.
4	Q So, in this case, the hypothesis,
5	the pineapple, fruit, whatever it is, is the
6	same in both the cans and it's merely the
7	wrapping that is different?
8	A Sure.
9	Q And so,
10	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Well, that's
11	another assumption you make.
12	MR. MALONE: Well,
13	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: That Dole
14	sells the same fruit under two different
15	labels.
16	MR. MALONE: Let's ask the witness
17	if he knows.
18	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Well, he's
19	already says he doesn't know.
20	MR. MALONE: I didn't understand
21	him to indicate that, Your Honor.
22	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Oh, I'm

1	sorry.
2	THE WITNESS: I was accepting that
3	as an assumption,
4	MR. MALONE: I see.
5	THE WITNESS: quite frankly. I
6	was not testifying
7	MR. MALONE: I see.
8	THE WITNESS: as a pineapple
9	expert.
10	(Laughter.)
11	BY MR. MALONE:
12	Q But from your experience in the
13	economics business, there are examples of
14	private labeling where the product is
15	precisely the same?
16	A I'd expect there are.
17	Q And, but again, the manufacturer
18	in that case is after profit maximization?
19	A Yes.
20	Q Looking to page 45 of your
21	testimony, about the middle of the page in the
22	paragraph that begins Live365 reports, you say

that you have assumed an average of 15.5 plays per hour. I don't find any other discussion of that numerical value elsewhere in your testimony and I'm asking where it comes from?

A I believe I used the conversion ratio that currently converts plays to the hourly fees under the statutory license. There but -- I would think it comes pretty close to what the number of plays are in a subscription service.

Q All right. Assuming for a moment that's correct, did you do any analysis or investigation as to whether the 15.5 is applicable across the webcasting industry as a whole? I mean, what's the range here that we're really working with?

A I would suspect the range, if we're including commercials networks as well as noncommercial networks, that it would be below 15.5 for the commercial networks and 15.5 might in fact be about where it is for the subscription networks?

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1	Q And then you mentioned
2	noncommercial and I didn't understand where
3	you put that.
4	A I didn't. I must have been
5	mistaken. What I meant the distinction
6	between subscription and non-subscription.
7	So, I expect that the non-subscription
8	commercial by their meaning it has
9	commercials, in non-subscription market, the
LO	non-subscription webcasts supported by
L1	commercials, that those would tend to have
L2	fewer plays than the subscription market which
L3	does not have commercials because of the time
L4	and the hour that it's being used by the
L <b>5</b>	commercials, leaving less time for music.
-6	Q But you didn't make any actual
.7	measurements as to noncommercial simulcasts,
.8	that is, simulcast by noncommercial
.9	broadcasters?
20	A I did not make an assessment of
1	that, correct.
2	Q And you have no data then on that

1	point at all?
2	A I have not looked at any data on
3	that.
4	Q And to what extent does this 15.5
5	plays per hour, what's the sensitivity
6	analysis on that figure?
7	A It's directly I mean, it's a
8	direct mathematical relationship if it's if
9	the number of plays were higher, and we were
10	to continue with the assumption of 45 hours
11	per month, then, for example, if there were 20
12	plays, you would get 900 plays per month and
13	you'd divide 900 into the monthly fee, the
14	\$1.63 and get the resulting per play fee of
15	\$1.63 divided by 900. So
16	Q So the only place you use the 15.5
17	is in connection with attributing a per play
18	value based on a subscription service?
19	A Well, it's based on the
20	assumptions as stated here, which I did I
21	was not even trying to capture exactly what's
22	going on in the market because, as I said, the

Live365 claims 32 hours per month and I
grossed that up quite a bit. So, it's an
attempt to try to give what I believe is a
reasonable and conservative number. It's not
scientifically pegged to a specific type or
use of webcasting.
Q But in fact the 32 hours per month
may have no particular applicability to
certain types of simulcast?
A It might not.
MR. MALONE: I think I have no
further questions.
CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Mr.
Freundlich, I believe, has left. He was here
earlier. Have everyone had their opportunity
to cross-examine?
(No response.)
CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: All right,
thank you. Any redirect Mr. Handzo?
MR. HANDZO: Yes, Your Honor, if I
might just have a minute to collect my notes,

1	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Certainly.
2	MR. HANDZO: I would appreciate
3	it.
4	MR. JOSEPH: Your Honor, while Mr.
5	Handzo is collecting, I do have a housekeeping
6	question, actually. Are we expecting Mr.
7	Simson to come over or are we I need to
8	make appropriate arrangements, if we are. I'm
9	just not sure.
10	MR. HANDZO: Well, we're actually
11	sort of in email contact as we speak. When we
12	had I guess my sense would be, between the
13	redirect and what I would expect to be
14	recross, I would expect that we would eat up
15	enough of the rest of our small remaining time
16	that it didn't make sense to bring him.
17	MR. JOSEPH: I don't object to
18	that, Your Honor, I just wanted to know
19	whether I needed to have people come over.
20	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: That seems
21	very unlikely.
22	MR. JOSEPH: Okay.

CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Why don't we
just go ahead and secure that possibility.
That doesn't make any sense for me to it
would take you that long to get through
security.
MR. JOSEPH: Thank you, Your
Honor.
(Laughter.)
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. HANDZO:
Q Good afternoon, again, Dr.
Pelcovits.
A Good afternoon, Mr. Handzo.
Q Dr. Pelcovits, when you were
testifying yesterday, you were asked whether
you made an adjustment in your benchmark with
respect to tethered downloads. Do you recall
that?
A I do.
Q Okay. And would you remind us
what tethered downloads are?
A Sure. Tethered downloads that are

obtained from the subscription webcast service
by the subscribing customer. They are
downloaded to the computer and they are
essentially like a mission impossible kind of
tape. They will magically erase themselves if
you end your subscription to the service. And
there's also a mechanism for tracking how many
plays are made of the music on the person's
computer when they're offline as well as
online.
Q Now, as I understand it, under
certain circumstances, you know, some services
might allow you to transfer that tether
download to a portable device. Is that
correct?
A Yes, that's correct, usually at an
additional fee.
Q Okay. And so where there could be
a transfer to a portable device, am I right
that you didn't include those services when
you determined your benchmark?

When I determined my benchmark and

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1	developed this 0.55 adjustment factor, that's
2	correct.
3	Q Okay. So, what we're talking
4	about in terms of adjustment is tethered
5	downloads that cannot be put onto a portable
6	device?
7	A That's correct.
8	Q All right. Now, with respect to
9	those kinds of tethered downloads, do you
10	recall reading the testimony of Mr. Roback of
11	Yahoo with respect to services that Yahoo
12	offers that have both tethered capability and
13	non-tethered capability?
14	A I don't recall his testimony. I
15	do know that Yahoo provides, as part of its
16	Yahoo music service, tethered downloads as
17	part and parcel of the music service that it
18	offers on subscription basis.
19	Q All right. Let me see if I can
20	refresh your recollection here. I'm going to
21	mark this as SoundExchange Exhibit 276 DP,
22	just to continue with our number system

1	(Whereupon, the document
2	referred to as
3	SoundExchange Exhibit No.
4	276 DP was marked
5	for identification.)
6	BY MR. HANDZO:
7	Q Have you had a chance to review
8	that?
9	A I have.
10	Q And do you see where Mr. Roback
11	says that MusicMatch on-demand has one version
12	where you can get conditional tethered
12 13	where you can get conditional tethered downloads?
13	downloads?
13 14	downloads?  A I see that.
13 14 15	downloads?  A I see that.  Q Okay. And you see that Yahoo does
13 14 15 16	downloads?  A I see that.  Q Okay. And you see that Yahoo does  not charge any more for that capability?
13 14 15 16 17	downloads?  A I see that.  Q Okay. And you see that Yahoo does  not charge any more for that capability?  A Yes.
13 14 15 16 17	downloads?  A I see that.  Q Okay. And you see that Yahoo does  not charge any more for that capability?  A Yes.  Q Does that affect your opinion as
13 14 15 16 17 18	downloads?  A I see that.  Q Okay. And you see that Yahoo does not charge any more for that capability?  A Yes.  Q Does that affect your opinion as to whether you would need to adjust for

1	adjustment, but this value to the the
2	potential value to the consumer of tethered
3	downloads is included in the overall
4	adjustment I make. And, specifically with
5	respect to MusicMatch and, I think, across the
6	market, these tethered downloads are becoming,
7	they're at a normal feature of the
8	subscription music services.
9	Q Okay. So, it's already been
10	adjusted for, in effect?
11	A It has already been adjusted for.
12	Q All right. Now, you also said
13	that you didn't make a separate adjustment for
14	bit rates or sound quality?
15	A That's correct.
16	Q Can you explain to us why you
17	didn't do that?
18	A I did not make a separate
19	adjustment for bit quality because there is
20	nothing under the statute that restricts the
21	bit rate for the statutory webcasts to be
22	anything different than what it is for the

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interactive services. It's up to the webcaster what bit rate to provide the service at and, if that's up to the webcaster, then the record labels would expect to charge a single rate rather than make an adjustment based on what webcasters might have done in the past or whatever happens to be in the market right now.

Q You also testified that you didn't make a separate adjustment for the number of channels offered by a given webcaster. Again, why not?

A For the same reason that it's up to the webcaster what type of service to try to put together and sell in the market. And under the statutory license, they can provide whatever type of service in terms of number of channels, how narrowly targeted the channels are to consumers and sell that in the market. And that, I believe, since it's up to the webcaster how to use this music subject to the restrictions in the statute, that it shouldn't

1	have a separate adjustment between the
2	interactive market and the non-interactive
3	market.
4	Q Now, you also have some questions
5	about the fact that you used as your benchmark
6	subscription services and whether that sort of
7	model is then applicable to ad supported
8	services.
9	The first question, I guess, is,
10	let's assume for the sake of argument that the
11	revenues for ad supported services were
12	different than the revenues for subscription
13	services. Would that have any impact on the
14	percentage of revenue component of your
15	proposed fee?
16	A Well that would, that would not
17	that would actually lead to less being paid
18	where there is less revenue being collected.
19	Q So the percentage of revenue fee
20	is in effect, self-adjusting?
21	A It's self-adjusting where there is
22	no subscription fee or alternatively, where

1	the per play rate doesn't also come into the
2	market.
3	Q So, in terms of the application of
4	your model to an ad supported service, the per
5	subscriber rate is not relevant because there
6	are no subscribers. Correct?
7	A Right.
8	Q And the percentage of revenue is,
9	in effect, self-adjusting?
10	A Correct.
11	Q And so what we're really talking
12	about here is the per play rate?
13	A Yes.
14	Q Now, in your view, Dr. Pelcovits,
15	would record companies be able to
16	differentially price with respect to the per
17	play rate as between ad supported services and
18	subscription supported services?
19	A Under the statute I mean, it
20	depends on how the statutes is actually and
21	how the Court rules.
22	Q Well, let me put it this way. I

guess I'm not asking as a legal matter. Is a willing seller going to want to price differently between the two?

Not without a Α Not necessarily. very compelling evidence that that was going increase their revenues, rather than decrease their revenues. So, so long as there certain degree ο£ consumer is а substitutability between non-subscription and subscription services, the record companies would be putting their revenues at risk if they tried to set a lower rate for the subscription services, I'm sorry, for the nonsubscription services and the subscription services.

Q And they would be putting their revenues at risk, why?

Because the lower, the lower Α price, namely, if the lower prices for nonyield subscription would services potentially better deal for consumers and those rather than would consumers use

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1	subscription services, so I mean, the term is
2	cannibalization but it's essentially
3	substitutability on the consumption side for
4	the two services and low prices drive out high
5	prices.
6	Q Now you were asked some questions
7	recently by Mr. Joseph about assuming that
8	there were certain prices in the market for a
9	subscription interactive service and a
10	subscription non-interactive service. I think
11	the numbers he used were \$6 and \$8 and then he
12	asked you what would happen if you changed the
13	fee. Do you recall that?
14	Now, in your view, if the fee
15	charged by the record companies in the non-
16	interactive market changed, would that change
17	the price to consumers?
18	A I expect it would, yes.
19	Q Okay. So, there would simply be a
20	new equilibrium reached there?
21	A There would be a new equilibrium
22	reached.

1	Q Let me ask you to look at page 51
2	of your testimony. And down towards the
3	bottom, you talked about your assumption of a
4	linear demand curve. Do you see that?
5	A I do.
6	Q And you characterized it as a
7	neutral assumption. Do you see that?
8	A Yes.
9	Q Can you tell us why?
10	A Yes. It's neutral because the
11	effect of a price change on the quantity
12	demanded can be more pronounced or less
13	pronounced than what is indicated by the
14	linear demand curve. So, that's why I called
15	it a neutral assumption. It's a very standard
16	in economics to give you a result where you
17	don't have the wealth of data you would need
18	to try to estimate a specific form of the
19	demand code.
20	Q In other words, a different
21	assumption might have favored the webcasters?
22	A It could go either way.

1	Q Okay. You were asked some
2	questions, I think this morning, by Mr.
3	Steinthal, who was positing that the prices
4	charged to consumers in the interactive market
5	might be set artificially low by the
6	webcasters because they wanted to build an
7	audience. Do you recall that?
8	A Yes.
9	Q Okay. Now, when you derived your
10	rate in this case, you were using a ratio
11	between the fee charged by the record
12	companies and the price charged to consumers.
13	Do you recall that?
14	A Yes.
15	Q And that ratio was based on the
16	ratio in the interactive benchmark market. Is
17	that correct?
18	A Correct.
19	Q Okay. Now, if the price to
20	consumers were to go up such that the
21	percentage of revenue component of the fee
22	became the operative fee, would the increase

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1	in consumer price change the ratio?
2	A No, it wouldn't.
3	Q Why is that?
4	A The nature of percentages that if
5	you're charging, let's say, 40 percent of a
6	price, then the ratio's going to be 0.4. It
7	doesn't matter where the price is.
8	Q Okay. So, if Mr. Steinthal were
9	correct and the consumer price went up, that
10	wouldn't change the ratio on what which you
11	based your analysis?
12	A No. It would not change the ratio
13	based on a percentage of revenue portion of
14	the fee structure.
15	MR. STEINTHAL: Your Honor, I'm
16	not sure what ratio he's referring to. So, my
17	objection is to the question insofar as I'm
18	not sure what ratio, of all the ratios that
19	have been talked about, the witness is
20	referring to.
21	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Is that a
22	proper objection?

1	MR. STEINTHAL: Well, I hope so.
2	(Laughter.)
3	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: I think
4	that's more a question for your next time to
5	examine.
6	MR. STEINTHAL: Okay.
7	MR. HANDZO: Let me I'm happy
8	to try and clarify it because
9	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: You may
10	oppose Mr. Handzo.
11	MR. HANDZO: At this point, I can
12	use all the help I can get.
13	BY MR. HANDZO:
14	Q The ratio that we were just
15	talking about, is that the ratio between the
16	fee charged by record companies in the
17	interactive market and the price charged to
18	consumers in the interactive market?
19	A Yes.
20	Q Okay.
21	MR. STEINTHAL: I'm glad he
22	clarified that.

1	BY MR. HANDZO:
2	Q Dr. Pelcovits, let me ask you to
3	take a look at The Services Exhibit 62, which
4	is the <u>Arbitron</u> study.
5	A I have that now.
6	Q Okay. And I believe Mr. Steinthal
7	directed your attention to paragraph 25 on
8	page 14?
9	A Yes, I believe.
10	Q And correct me if I'm wrong, but I
11	think what you indicated there was the fact
12	that there might be a correlation between
13	streaming and CD purchases did not mean that
14	there was a causal effect between the two?
15	A Yes.
16	Q Let me ask you to take a look at
17	the next paragraph, paragraph 26.
18	A I see that.
19	Q All right. And do you see that
20	that reports that people who stream see more
21	movies?
22	A Yes.

1	Q What does that does that affect
2	your opinion about whether there's a
3	correlation or causation here?
4	A I think it's a good example of a
5	correlation and
6	Q Rather than causation?
7	A it's showing the danger of
8	drawing conclusions about causation from
9	correlations.
10	Q Dr. Pelcovits, do you have any
11	experience with consumer surveys that attempt
12	to get consumers to either predict or report
13	the level of their consumption of goods or
14	services?
15	A I do.
16	Q Tell us what that experience is?
17	MR. STEINTHAL: Your Honor, this
18	is I object. I believe this is beyond the
19	scope of our cross-examination. This witness
20	is experienced in surveys.
21	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: On that
22	objection, with the examination involving such

a survey, the subject Exhibit 62 is overruled.

THE WITNESS: I do have experience with guite a lot of surveying that was done in the telecommunications industry. And I would say that, as a general matter, surveys are not obtaining estimates from very good at consumers of sort of how many things they buy And that the and how much they spend. industry, the telecommunications industry, certainly relied much more on data that was obtained from customer bills rather anything from surveys.

#### BY MR. HANDZO:

Q Now, you mentioned in response to one of --

MR. JOSEPH: Just a point of clarification, whose surveys would you be referring to there? Surveys done by the industry or a wider group of surveys?

THE WITNESS: This would really be both, that either conducted internally or conducted by an outside party.

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

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1	MR. JOSEPH: And including
2	government surveys?
3	THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, I didn't
4	
5	MR. JOSEPH: Including government
6	surveys?
7	THE WITNESS: I don't have
8	knowledge of surveys by the government asking
9	people how much they spend in specific, very
10	specific, industries. So, I can't say.
11	MR. JOSEPH: Okay. I just wanted
12	to clarify which surveys we were talking
13	about.
14	BY MR. HANDZO:
15	Q You mentioned in response to one
16	of Mr. Steinthal's questions that you actually
17	looked at the overall shipments of CDs in the
18	U.S.?
19	A I did.
20	Q Can you tell us what you found
21	when you did that?
22	A I did. I found that the average

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

number of CDs purchased per person in the
United States is far lower than indicated from
the survey here. This indicates an average
American purchases 13 CDs in the past year and
I recall a later <u>Arbitron</u> study showing ten
CDs a year. If you take CD shipments which
are approximately 700,000,000, which is public
RIAA data and divide it by, if not the entire
population, the populations say of all of a
certain age, age ten or so, you're going to
get about three and a half CDs as the average
number of CDs purchased per person.
And that would indicate that
customers responding to the survey are
overestimating what they're spending or that
their survey is not very representative of the
population.
MR. HANDZO: May I just have a
moment, Your Honor?
CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: That's fine.
MR. HANDZO: I believe that's all
MR. HANDZO: I Delleve that's all

I have.

1	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Mr.
2	Steinthal, any recross?
3	MR. STEINTHAL: Just briefly, Your
4	Honor.
5	RECROSS-EXAMINATION
6	BY MR. STEINTHAL:
7	Q Dr. Pelcovits, first of all, on
8	this issues of subscription, non-subscription
9	and pricing at the higher value use versus not
10	pricing at the higher value use and avoiding
11	cannibalization, that general subject that's
12	come up, let me ask you this question.
13	Assume if you will,
14	hypothetically, that ten percent of the demand
15	in a market is willing to pay nine units per
16	good for a certain good. Okay?
L7	A Okay.
18	Q And assume 90 percent of the
19	market demand is not willing to pay, directly
20	or indirectly, more than 1.1 units for the
21	same good. Wouldn't you agree with me that a
22	profit maximizing seller, if it had to choose

between selling to the highest value user at nine units for ten percent of the demand and the 90 percent of the market willing to pay 1.1 unit, they'd be better off selling to the 90 percent of the market?

A No, because that presumes. I can do the math, too. Your math would show you'd get 90 units of currency from the ten percent versus 99 units of currency from the 90 percent of the demand and, therefore, it would appear, based on your example, to suggest that you're better off setting a price of 1.1. But that assumes that what you observe in the market by a 10 percent/90 percent breakdown is itself going to stay the same. If you were to only offer the \$9 price.

Q Well, hypothetically, it is going to stay the same. If that's the assumption and you have no evidence upon which to assume that the consumers are going to change their behavior from that assumption, the profit maximizing seller would sell to the 90 percent

1	of the market. Right?
2	A If you make all of those
3	assumptions, yes.
4	Q Okay. Now, the ratio question.
5	A Oh, no.
6	Q I need to put this back up, just
7	to clarify something because now I know why I
8	was confused. Because I was thinking about a
9	different ratio than the one that you were
10	testifying about. I just want to confirm
11	that.
12	Back to 6.2. Let's focus on line
13	3 of each of those entries on 6.2. That
14	refers to a ratio, does it not?
15	A It does.
16	Q And that's not the ratio you were
17	addressing in responding to Mr. Handzo.
18	Correct?
19	A That's correct.
20	Q And it's true, is it not, and I
21	think we went over this when I asked a
22	question, which is to clarify, if the monthly

price paid by the benchmark market interactive
services increased, the ratio would decrease.
So you'd go from a ratio of one to two,
perhaps to one to three, or one to four,
depending on just how high that price for the
benchmark market service went up. Correct?
A Yes.
Q And hypothetically, the lower
those ratios are, the lower the resulting
price, in your model. Correct? For the non-
interactive target market service?
A For the non-interactive target
services that I calculated to be \$4.56, yes.
That would be a lower number.
Q Okay. Now the testimony you gave
about surveys?
A Yes.
Q First of all, in your experience
Q First of air, in your experience
as an economist, I gather you have relied upon
as an economist, I gather you have relied upon

1	underlying specifics in terms of who has been
2	surveyed and what the parameters are, I gather
3	you would just be uncomfortable giving any
4	testimony about whether a given survey is a
5	good one or a bad one?
6	A Unless I knew the organization
7	that performed it.
8	Q And by the way, you gave some
9	testimony about the CD sales or shipments.
10	First of all, were you referring to sales or
11	were you referring to shipments?
12	A I don't recall how the RIAA
13	reports which of the two is reporting.
14	Q And it's fair to say that what you
15	were testifying to is that you had come across
16	certain data that you were recalling, but it's
17	true that you didn't do any analysis of the
18	sales and shipments data of the recording
19	industry as part of your engagement here?
20	A I reviewed a lot of statistics. I
21	did not compute them or examine the underlying
22	data. That is publicly reported by RIAA every

1	year and it's reported on their website and
2	downloaded and that's the number I was talking
3	about.
4	MR. STEINTHAL: One second, Your
5	Honor. I have no further questions, Your
6	Honor.
7	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Mr. Joseph,
8	any further questions?
9	MR. JOSEPH: No further questions,
10	Your Honor.
11	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Ms. Brown?
12	MS. BROWN: No further questions,
12 13	MS. BROWN: No further questions, Your Honor.
13	Your Honor.
13 14	Your Honor.  CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: And Mr.
13 14 15	Your Honor.  CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: And Mr.  Malone?
13 14 15 16	Your Honor.  CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: And Mr.  Malone?  MR. MALONE: Yes, please, Your
13 14 15 16 17	Your Honor.  CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: And Mr.  Malone?  MR. MALONE: Yes, please, Your  Honor.
13 14 15 16 17 18	Your Honor.  CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: And Mr.  Malone?  MR. MALONE: Yes, please, Your  Honor.  CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: All right.
13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Your Honor.  CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: And Mr.  Malone?  MR. MALONE: Yes, please, Your  Honor.  CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: All right.  BY MR. MALONE:

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	concerning ten percent of the market being
2	nine units and that 90 percent of the market
3	paying 1.1 unit. And I understood your answer
4	to be that if the seller priced the 90 percent
5	of the market, he would get 99 percent or 99
6	units.
7	Is it not true, however, that the
8	ten percent of the market would also purchase
9	at the lower price?
10	A It very well might.
11	Q So even that event would get 100
12	percent of the market?
13	A Well, you get 100 percent of the
14	market in either case, once you have a single
15	price. It's a question of in which price
16	times which quantity gives you more money.
17	Q All right. Let me ask the
18	question then a little more carefully.
19	MR. HANDZO: I'm sorry. I feel
20	some need to interpose an objection here. I'm
21	not sure it's appropriate to recross on
22	somebody else's recross. He can recross on my

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1	redirect, but not Mr. Steinthal's recross.
2	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Well, we'll
3	give Mr. Malone a little leeway.
4	MR. MALONE: I think we're one
5	question away, Mr. Handzo.
6	MR. HANDZO: I'm sorry I held it
7	up then.
8	BY MR. MALONE:
9	Q So, in terms of units, what would
10	the seller in that case be bringing in the
11	door at the lower price?
12	A Well, can we use I'll call the
13	units dollars
14	Q You may.
15	A United States dollars. So, in
16	which case, if you set a price at \$1.10 and
17	you sold, previously you were selling ten
18	units in the high end, 90 units in the lower
19	end, you'd now be selling 100 units at \$1.10,
20	so you'd get \$110.
21	Q So, the incentive for the lower
22	price would be slightly greater than your

1	original answer?
2	A The yes, the money you would
3	get is greater than what I previously
4	indicated. You're right.
5	Q And the profit maximizing seller
6	would choose the larger number, I take it?
7	A Well, he'd hopefully do the math
8	right and he'd choose between \$110 and \$9
9	times however many units would have been sold
10	in the market, should the \$9 commodity be the
11	only thing available.
12	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: All right.
13	That seems to conclude the examination of Dr.
14	Pelcovits.
15	The parties present couldn't
16	appreciate the phenomena that as soon as we
17	determined, about 15 minutes ago, that we were
18	going to finish earlier than expected, there
19	were, the attitude of this room significantly
20	improved.
21	(Laughter.)

1	first time I've seen smiles on people's faces
2	in a couple of days. It's been quite
3	refreshing.
4	That completing the evidence
5	today, anything to address before we adjourn?
6	MR. HANDZO: Only, Your Honor,
7	that I have just been handed SoundExchange's
8	response to RLI's motion requesting referral
9	of material questions of substantive law,
10	which I understand has been filed. So again,
11	if the Court would like courtesy copies, I can
12	distribute those.
13	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: No, thank
14	you.
15	MR. HANDZO: Okay.
16	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: All right. I
17	have omitted a critical part of our day. I
18	hope it doesn't affect the mood of the room.
19	Any question from the bench to Dr.
20	Pelcovits?
21	JUDGE ROBERTS: Mr. Pelcovits, if
22	I'm correct, you testified earlier that, in

1	your determination, the rate that the CARP set
2	in 2002 was a below market value rate. Is
3	that correct?
4	THE WITNESS: Yes. I said, as we
5	see right now. I didn't try to judge the
6	market of 2002, but I believe it's below what
7	the willing buyer and willing seller would pay
8	now.
9	JUDGE ROBERTS: In the current
10	market?
11	THE WITNESS: In the current
12	market.
13	JUDGE ROBERTS: And, therefore, I
14	take it that means you did not seek to apply
15	your model to any data from 2001 or 2002 as to
16	whether the CARP got it right at that point in
17	time?
18	THE WITNESS: That's correct.
19	JUDGE ROBERT: Do you have any
20	view as to whether the CARP got it right in
21	2002?
22	THE WITNESS: No, I don't. I have

1	not tried to look at it from that perspective.
2	JUDGE ROBERTS: Thank you. That's
3	all.
4	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Judge
5	Wisniewski?
6	JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Just a couple
7	of questions.
8	Dr. Pelcovits, we've been talking
9	a lot about demand curves in this proceeding
10	so we haven't really said a whole lot about
11	the supply curves, the underlying supply
12	curves.
13	I wonder if you can tell me what
14	you think the shape of the supply curve is in
15	the ultimate output market here, the consumer
16	market that you talked about? And then, also,
17	the supply curve or the shape of the supply
18	curve in the input market that you talked
19	about?
20	THE WITNESS: I'll be happy to
21	address that. I think in the output market,
22	it is a very elastic supply. The factors of

1	production, other than the input we're talking
2	about, the music are readily available, easily
3	reproducible and can accommodate significant
4	increases in supply without an increase in
5	price.
6	I think with respect to the music,
7	they're really, with respect to the music that
8	is already created, there really is no change
9	in the traditional sense of more of that being
10	recreated. Essentially, it's a license and
11	actually, from the standpoint of supply of
12	more licenses, if there was no copyright
13	owner, it would be again, infinitely elastic
14	supply. So, we're really, what happens in
15	the market is
16	JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Wait, let me
17	catch up. What did you say?
18	THE WITNESS: Infinitely elastic
19	supply. JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: With
20	respect to?
21	THE WITNESS: With respect to
22	licenses. Licenses are, essentially, are just

a permission. So, if there was multiple competing providers of a copyright license to the same sound recording, I would say it would command a zero price. And you could provide infinite amounts of it at a zero price.

JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: So, you're looking at it, the product being supplied, as being a license that is somehow unlimited in terms of what it can deliver. Is that what you're saying?

THE WITNESS: That's how I'd look at the issue of supply, in a traditional sense Ιf of looking supply. what we're at considering is the copyrighted music, as the law stands that only the copyright owner can offer it, it's really οf more not traditional supply curve. It's a profit maximization calculation that the supplier undertakes. So, it's not as if you can say what the price will be at any particular level of output, because that depends on -- it's not intersection, strictly speaking,

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demand and supply curve, it's an intersection of a demand curve and a profit maximization calculation by the supplier.JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Well, if we have a blanket license, doesn't that actually fix the supply over the term of the contract?

THE WITNESS: I don't think I put it that way. I think the supply might be, the supply here, -- I sort of see the market as, if we're thinking of sort of the quantity as being the number of subscribers to these different services, or the number of times the music is listened to, or something of that nature, there's really no cost associated from the copyright owner's standpoint. No physical costs. There are opportunity costs, but there is no actual production costs of having that music played again, again, and again by as many subscribers as possible.

JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: So then, if I could pursue this just a bit further. If I can try and understand what you're saying

1	here.
2	The supply wouldn't be fixed
3	because even though the number of sound
4	recordings might be fixed, the number of times
5	that they could be played is infinitesimal or
6	infinite, I should say?
7	THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes. And also
8	with respect to the number of sound
9	recordings, there are new ones being produced
10	all the time, so there is some supply,
11	traditional sort of supply, curve in that
12	market.
13	JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: So, from an
14	endpoint of view, it's not actually the sound
15	recordings but the number of times that they
16	could be played?
17	THE WITNESS: That's the way that
18	I've tried to analyze it with respect to this
19	market for the blanket license, yes.
20	JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Okay. I'm just
21	trying to get a handle on that, from your
22	perspective.

The I guess part of that, you
had, in your testimony, talked about a change
in the copyright fee being passed along to the
consumer dollar for dollar. Does that
actually result then in the typical fashion in
which you would apply, for example, a tax,
which would represent a shift in the supply
curve?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: I guess the
last couple of questions that I have here
relate back to your regression in table 6.1.
Page 39 of your testimony.
THE WITNESS: Thank you, very
much. I've got it.
JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: I wonder if you
could, at the risk of altering the mood in the
room, I wonder if you could take us through
each of the arguments in your specification
here and tell us a couple of things about
them?
One, I'll give them to you all in

a lump so that you can -- one is, which of the arguments ultimately proved significant and at what level, at what confidence level?

Secondly, if you could tell me what the source data was for each of the variables?

And third, if you could tell me, theoretically, as to how they fit together? Why you chose the variables you chose in this specification as opposed to some other group of variables with respect to this quality estimation?

THE WITNESS: By all means.

I think it's appropriate to start with the dependent variable, which is essentially for everyone else here, what we're trying to explain through the regression. So, at the risk of getting a lot of people in the audience bored, essentially, we're taking the monthly price and taking the logarithm of the monthly subscription price and we have an observation for every one of the 30 services.

Then, going down the list of variables -- let me back up for a second.

The source data in all cases was compiled by my staff, using the web pages of the different music services. We started by doing a very broad search to try to find all the services that we could and these are the ones that were the subscription services available at the market, at that point in time. We also attempted, from our of the number to count essentially catalogue, stations, to essentially created a database and catalogued the number of radio stations, whether or not it was interactive, which here is meant to be on-demand or not, and the same thing with respect to download and sound quality. And I apologize, don't remember what the Ι breakpoints were in sound quality, at what bit rate. And it was a little hard to determine that, but to the extent the services reported it, we tired to capture that. So, that's the

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1 | source data.

And then with respect to the individual variables, there's first the intercept. And the intercept simply sort of roots the equation at some point, essentially on the vertical axis. It's just simply a way of fitting an equation. If you were to think of this again for other members, other court members, if you're thinking of trying to fit a -- can I use a piece of paper here? Do you mind?

JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: There's a bulletin board --

THE WITNESS: Okay. That would be fine.

If we were to imagine that we're trying to explain something where we can observe a spatter of data and the data tells us something about the price and something about, let's in this case, we're in two dimensions, whether it's a number of radio stations or whatever the explanatory variable

is, all the intercept does is say, let's draw that line and have it hit this access there. So, it's just simply telling you where to start the line. And then all of these others are telling you what the slope of the line is with respect to that variable. So, that's the intercept. It's highly significant and it's just simply, that's just the nature of what the data does.

number of radio log of The stations and the square of the log of the number of radio stations, we put in two First we put it in logs, variables there. because it would appear that this has a, should have a percentage relationship between number of radio stations and the price, rather than that going from five to six was the same as going from 200 to 201. That would -- if you use a linear measure, you're going to make the assumption that five to six is the same as 100 to 101, the logarithmic turns it into a percentage relationship. So, that's

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reason for using a log.

just to see if there was some nonlinearity even in the logarithmic form. We tried various specifications here. None of them proved to be very significant. And then, we have interactivity which was a zero/one variable. In other words, one if it is ondemand, zero if it's not. And the coefficient estimate is highly significant, T value of 4.5, which would give you a greater than 99 percent confidence interval.

The next variable, download to portable device, is also a zero/one variable, zero where it's not downloaded, one where it is downloadable. Coefficient 0.48 and T value 2.57. I don't recall where that gives you as far as confidence. My guess is that it would be over 95 percent, but I'm not sure where exactly it lies.

Sound quality was, from an econometric standpoint, not very helpful. In

fact, it's the wrong sign because it indicates that as sound quality goes up, people would pay less. So, it's clearly not picking up the true effect of sound quality. There's only a very limited variation in the sound quality in the sample we chose and I attach no significance to it.

I also had, if you'll see in the note, there were some dummy variables for Digital Imported service and Bell South's Those were outliers. The Digital service. imported price and was way up there and wasn't explainable by anything else. And, in fact, I think as Mr. Steinthal pointed out to me, they've dropped the price. So, we tried various ways to deal with this. We excluded them from the regression, we put in dummies. In my opinion it was an aberration in the market and that's how I treated it in the regression. And I think that's how the market seems to be treating it.

And the Bell South we, again, it

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1	was an odd observation. And again, we tried
2	it with Bell South in and Bell South out. We
3	tried a lot of specifications and they
4	provided the same results or, as I said, some
5	of them such as sound quality, just didn't
6	give us anything satisfactory.
7	So, I hope that answers your
8	question, Your Honor.
9	JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: The values on
10	those two dummies were high. Right?
11	THE WITNESS: Yes, they were, I
12	believe. I can go back and check.
13	JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: While you're
14	doing that, one other question on the sound
15	quality variable. How did you quantify that?
16	I'm sorry, was it a
17	THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. We set
18	up a tier. So, we said, when we originally
19	looked at these services, we said well, let's
20	try to do something about sound quality, and
21	we set up, or my research assistant set up
22	something where he set up, the right word

here is, sort of groupings. So, there was
from, lets say zero to 28 kilobits per second
was low quality, 28 to 56 was medium quality,
above 56 was high quality. And we actually,
I think one of the early observations we saw,
a little more variation in them when we looked
at the sample more carefully and looked at the
services more carefully, we found that there
was only one observation that turned out to
have medium quality. But all the others, it
seems pretty natural as part of being a
subscription service, were providing things
above a certain, I think it was 56 or 64
JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: I guess the
question I had was what numbers did you
question I had was what numbers did you actually use?
actually use?
actually use?  THE WITNESS: I don't recall. I'd
actually use?  THE WITNESS: I don't recall. I'd  be happy to provide them.
actually use?  THE WITNESS: I don't recall. I'd  be happy to provide them.  JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Okay. Thank

1	is what I heard you say. Is that
2	THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
3	JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Is that
4	correct?
5	Did you do an alternative
6	specification that had, that was limited to
7	the variables that you found to be significant
8	here?
9	THE WITNESS: The ones I have with
10	me here right now, I don't have a regression
11	like that. I don't know whether we tried it.
12	JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Okay. I was
13	just curious as to whether you did or how that
14	might have come up.
15	I don't think I have any further
16	questions.
17	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Any further
18	questions generated by those posed from the
19	bench?
20	MR. STEINTHAL: I have one
21	question, Your Honor.
22	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: All right.

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	RECROSS-EXAMINATION
2	BY MR. STEINTHAL:
3	Q Dr. Pelcovits, do I understand
4	from what you just said that the variable as
5	to the number of stations offered by the
6	service was such that you concluded that it,
7	the number of stations offered by the service
8	was not a significant or material aspect in
9	the value proposition?
LO	A That's the regression results.
L1	MR. STEINTHAL: Thank you.
L2	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Judge
L3	Wisniewski?
L4	JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Yes, I'm sorry,
L5	I did have one further question. Just as a
.6	matter of cleaning up an issue.
7	I believe that you had testified
.8	with respect to demand elasticity for a number
.9	of these markets. I was just wondering if you
20	had done any estimates of cross-price
21	elasticity of demand?
22	THE WITNESS: I did not.

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	JUDGE WISNIEWSKI: Thank you.
2	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Mr. Handzo?
3	MR. HANDZO: Nothing further.
4	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Okay. Well,
5	then that then completes our examination of
6	Dr. Pelcovits.
7	Any other matters to be addressed
8	before we recess for the day?
9	And our witness, again, in the
10	morning?
11	MR. HANDZO: I believe the
12	anticipated order is, I think, Brook Simson.
13	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Brook Vinson?
14	MR. HANDZO: Yes. I'm sorry, yes.
15	Fink. Fink Brook Vinson.
16	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Fink Brook?
17	MR. HANDZO: Yes.
18	CHIEF JUDGE SLEDGE: Thank you.
19	We'll recess until 9:30 in the morning.
20	(Whereupon, at 4:38 p.m., the
21	hearing was adjourned, to reconvene at 9:30
22	a.m., Wednesday, May 17, 2006.)

#### **NEAL R. GROSS**

#### **CERTIFICATE**

This is to certify that the foregoing transcript in the matter of:

> The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording and Ephemeral Recordings (Webcasting Rate Adjustment Proceeding)

Before:

Copyright Royalty Board

Date:

Tuesday, May 16, 2006

Place: Washington, D.C.

represents the full and complete proceedings of aforementioned matter, as reported and the reduced to typewriting.

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